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Executive Summary 
 
India has one of the world’s fastest growing economies, but it also has vast 
structural problems that hinder the country’s socioeconomic development. Most jobs are 
generated in the informal sector, where more than 80 percent of all workers are 
employed. Most Indians lack financial resources for retirement and rely on their 
families, whereas the family is becoming a less reliable source of support in old age due 
to decreasing fertility and the increasing mobility of the young. Longevity has increased 
rapidly, while people over 60 years of age are the fastest growing age cohort. Thus, 
there is a strong need to increase pension coverage for the population that largely 
consists of informal sector workers.  
The New Pension Scheme (NPS) was launched by the Government of India in 
May 2009 to increase pension coverage, particularly to the informal sector. NPS is a 
voluntary defined contribution scheme, which is distributed through licensed private 
sector institutions. The Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) 
in 2010 introduced two further reforms to increase coverage: the “Swavalamban” 
subsidy for poor workers, and NPS-Lite, which is a means of conducting group 
enrollments. NPS is distributed through “Points of Presence” (PoPs), which are 
financial sector institutions, including banks and insurance companies. NPS-Lite is 
distributed through “aggregators”, which are local institutions including NGOs and self-
help groups. The current number of 167,002 voluntary subscribers lags far behind its 
potential. Against this backdrop, the study addresses two research questions. First, why 
has the NPS approach attracted so few new subscribers until now? Second, which public 
policy solutions can increase the NPS enrollment rate? 
The NPS market forces are at the center of the analysis. The study develops its 
own theoretical framework that consists of a set of criteria to assess the (mis-)match of 
demand and supply to explain where policy options should be better targeted to address 
the current low enrollment rates. This study identifies four reasons for low coverage, 
which show a comprehensive picture of policy shortcomings in terms of all criteria. The 
scheme does not satisfy the demand for secure financial investments; its legal status and 
institutional architecture question the long-term stability of scheme and investments; 
there are severe shortcomings in the management of the scheme’s distribution channels, 
and a targeted marketing strategy has not been developed, which is necessary to attract 
the population.  
This study proposes a policy package of seven short- and long-term measures to 
increase NPS coverage. The most immediate and largest effects should result from two 
measures – improving the incentives for the PoPs and developing a targeted pull-
marketing strategy. The potential of the proposal is to increase coverage up to 40 
million in the medium run (5 years) and there is a vast market of 100 to 130 million 
persons with sufficient savings capacities in the long run.  
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I. Introduction 
If an emerging economy like India wants to foster “sustainable and inclusive 
growth”, fight poverty, and reduce inequalities (Planning Commission 2008), its 
government needs to provide a social safety net for its population. Otherwise, people will 
fall back into poverty again and again because of substantial income reductions due to 
social risks, including sickness, employment injury, and old age (Krishna 2010). Yet how 
can a country like India, which struggles with an increasing informal sector1, a poorly 
educated, non-registered and mobile population, establish social safety nets such as a 
pension system for a billion-plus population? Pension reform is one of the most difficult 
challenges in India’s “second generation” of economic reforms (IIEF 2011),2 which 
requires innovative public policy solutions primarily at the central government level.  
In January 2004, the Government of India (GoI) established the “New Pension 
Scheme” (NPS) for central and state government employees. Extended on 1 May 2009 to 
all citizens, the NPS is an ambitious initiative that provides voluntary contributory 
pensions to India’s vast informal sector. This paper focuses on this latter NPS pillar for 
all citizens.3 The responsible Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority 
(PFRDA) implemented an internationally unique approach to distribute the scheme 
through a “system of licensing and registration arrangements” (Butel, Bhardwaj 2010: 4) 
with private sector financial institutions (MacKellar 2009: 20). This new public-private 
partnership aims at distributing NPS on a large scale in India but the current number of 
167,002 voluntary NPS subscribers lags far behind its potential (Interview Nair 2011; 
Sanyal et al. 2011: 18). To assess the malfunction of the NPS, the study will address two 
research questions:  
1) Why has the NPS approach attracted so few new subscribers until now? 
2) Which public policy solutions can increase the NPS enrollment rate significantly? 
                                                        
1 The development literature distinguishes formal from informal sectors. “Employees are considered to 
have informal jobs if their employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national labour 
legislation, income taxation, [and] social protection (...)” (Hussmanns 2004: 6; see also II.2).  
2 The “first generation” refers to the liberalization of the economy and the opening of the markets after the 
foreign exchange crisis in 1991. “Second generation” reforms try to stimulate socioeconomic development 
with more comprehensive policies including economic, fiscal, and social policies (Jenkins, Khilnani 2004).  
3 Hereafter, “NPS” refers to this pillar only and not to the NPS for civil servants.  
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I.1 Scope and Relevance  
The rapidly growing Indian economy4 almost only generates informal jobs, which 
are not subject to labor law and do not foresee any form of social security for the aging 
population. Estimates of the percentage of the Indian workforce that comprises the 
informal sector range from 81 to 86 percent (Butel 2010; NCEUIS 2007: 4). The 
informal sector is where an estimated 95 percent of all new jobs in India are generated 
(Mariathasan 2010: 23). India is projected to become the most populous country by 2026 
(Nelson 2010) but the age cohort over 60 is growing fastest among the population and 
will reach 200 million in 2030 (UN 2008). Hence, India will become a rapidly ageing 
country before it becomes a high-income economy (Asher, Bali 2010: 68). Longevity 
increased rapidly. Today, poor Indians have an average life expectancy at age 30 of 73 
years (based on WHO 2009). At the same time the traditionally very strong Indian 
family, which has taken care of the elderly, is transforming because of rapidly decreasing 
fertility, rural depopulation, and altering value systems (PFRDA 2009). In 2007, an 
estimated 8.7 percent (37 million) of the approximately 425 million Indian workforce 
aged 15 to 65 was enrolled in a formal retirement plan including both public and private 
schemes (based on OECD 2009).5 In summary, the demographic transition, fiscal 
constraints, changing family structures, and low pension coverage define the importance 
of increasing coverage for the population that largely consists of informal sector workers.  
With the NPS reform of 2009, the GoI has tried to implement a scheme that 
increases coverage, particularly to the informal sector. As the analysis of the demand 
shows, enrollments lag far behind their potential of 40 million in the medium term. This 
paper provides policy recommendations to expand pension coverage, addressing Indian 
policy makers and technical assistance agencies that support social security provision in 
India. Many LDC in Asia, Africa, or Latin America share both the problem of low 
pension coverage and the conditions of aging populations as well as rising informal 
sectors (Asher 2009; Olivier 2009). Institutional structures and development stages make 
country-based approaches necessary. Nevertheless, this paper provides a case study that 
is relevant for other countries as well.  
                                                        
4 GDP growth is projected to reach 8.43 percent in 2011 (Nasser 2010). 
5 OECD 2009: 86, adjusted to a larger estimate on the size of the workforce based on Butel 2010: 109. 
Today the enrollment rate should be slightly higher due to additional enrollments in the last two years. 
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I.2 Approach and Methodology 
NPS is a voluntary defined contribution (DC) scheme,6 i.e. people have to favor NPS 
investments over other investments. Both market forces – demand and supply – need to 
be analyzed to understand where and how policy options should be targeted to address 
the current low enrollment rate resulting in these vast numbers of persons who will be 
without pension coverage in old age. Based on a comparison of the demand side for 
pensions in India and the NPS supply side, the study will assess the degree to which there 
is a mismatch of both sides resulting in low enrollment rates. The analysis is based on a 
review of the available literature, government documents, including regulations and 
policy papers of the PFRDA, as well as surveys including the following main sources: 
 IIMS Dataworks India Income and Savings Survey (IISS 2007 and 2008), and IFA 
Survey 2008 for indicators on the Indian financial and insurance market,  
 National Sample Surveys (NSS 1993-94; 2004-05) for indicators on female 
dependency and income, 
 New Pension Scheme Survey (NPSS 2004)7 for indicators on market segments, 
occupations, and financial behavior, and 
 UN Population Prospects (UN 2008) for demographic indicators. 
The study is additionally based on expert interviews with Indian stakeholders 
including Rani Nair, Executive Director of PFRDA, T. Koshy, Former Executive 
Director of the Central Recordkeeping Agency (CRA), Gautam Bhardwaj, Director of the 
Invest India Economic Foundation (IIEF), and Nishant Jain, Senior Technical Specialist 
on Social Protection at the German Development Agency GIZ. The interviews were 
conducted during a research stay in New Delhi in January 2011 (A. 1).  
There are two limitations of approach and methodology. First, there are limitations 
due to a lack of adequate data. Most surveys on India including the census are not 
conducted annually. The analysis often relies on data from 2004 due to the very relevant 
NPSS. For several indicators, there are different estimates, which are addressed in the 
                                                        
6 In a defined benefit (DB) system, the pension amount is predetermined. In a DC system “contributions are 
defined by a lump sum amount or percentage of salary. However benefits in this system depend sometimes 
on the returns of assets and sometimes are predetermined.” (Sanyal et al. 2011: 19).  
7 The data differ from data of the NSS 2004-05, which is used in public reports (NCEUIS 2007: 4). The 
NSS does not measure most indicators on saving capacities and financial behavior, which is measured by 
the NPSS. Thus, for consistency, the analysis will be based on the NPSS concerning both labor market data 
and financial behavior and will indicate when there are large differences between survey data.  
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individual cases to provide a comprehensive picture. Second, there are conceptual 
limitations due to questions that require further investigation. There are vast development 
differences between the 28 Indian states. In general, India has a north/south gradient. 
Most western and southern states are more developed, which is expressed in lower 
mortality, lower fertility, better education, and higher incomes (Adlakha 1997). The 
following analysis will, for the most part, rely on generalized data for India and 
differentiate only between rural and urban areas. In particular, this paper can only remain 
on this simplified level concerning policy options. If policy options are considered for 
implementation, additional research will be needed to check their appropriation for 
different Indian states. The same concern applies to the cost-analysis of the proposals, 
which has been simplified and would need to be analyzed further.    
 
I.3 Structure of the Paper 
The paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter II provides a theoretical and 
analytical basis for the empirical analysis in three steps. First, it develops a theoretical 
framework for the study by defining indicators for the analysis of supply and demand as 
well as criteria for the successful implementation of voluntary DC pension schemes in 
LDC. Second, it summarizes the development of the public pension system in India. And 
third, it provides a statistical picture of the policy problem. Chapter III constitutes the 
main part of the empirical analysis and investigates the market forces of NPS and in how 
far both sides match. The demand analysis provides a clearer picture of the relevant 
market segment in terms of gender, age, occupations, residential area, education, 
financial literacy, saving patterns, and the level of trust towards the private sector. In 
order to assess the supply of the NPS, the approach will be described in terms of its 
institutional architecture, enrollment processes, investment options, and marketing 
approaches. The chapter concludes with the answer to the first research question on 
reasons for low NPS coverage. Chapter IV answers the second research question on ways 
to increase NPS coverage. Finally, Chapter V concludes with a set of concrete policy 
recommendations, a medium-term outlook on the potential development of the NPS-
scheme, and questions for further research. 
 
II Theoretical and Analytical Framework   5 
 
 
II. Theoretical and Analytical Framework for the Study of 
Pensions in LDC 
Traditional social security approaches are based on a strict interpretation of social 
security as “formal employment-based social insurance” (Olivier 2009: 3). This concept 
is not applicable to LDC because the majority of the populations are informal workers 
(Ahmad 1991; Olivier 2009). Particularly in the case of India, it is important to 
differentiate between the (in)formal sectors and (in)formal work8 because there is an 
increasing share of informal employment in the formal sector (NCEUIS 2007: 4). This 
raises the relevance of finding social security solutions for informal workers in the 
informal and in the formal sector. The characteristics of informal employment are 
relevant for the design of pension schemes for three reasons. First, there is no possibility 
for social security wage deductions, as they are known in most OECD countries. Second, 
workers and enterprises are not registered, which complicates the identification of 
persons and data collection. Third, incomes are low on average. Thus, pension schemes 
must be designed in a way so that they are voluntary, allow for low contributions, and are 
financed by workers’ contributions as long as workers have savings capacities.  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank (WB) were the 
first institutions that extensively provided theoretical insights and empirical studies on 
social protection and pensions in LDC. The ILO established the “Social Protection Floor 
Initiative” in 2009, which is an institutionalized framework for knowledge sharing of 
researchers and policy makers. The WB established a research forum with its “Pension 
Primer” in 1998 with a strong focus on LDC. Nevertheless, social security in emerging 
economies is a research area that is still in its infancy. 
Holzmann and Jorgensen established a theoretical framework of social risk 
management (SRM), which applies to LDC. SRM is seen as an “investment in human 
capital formation” targeting the poor and those at risk of poverty to foster socioeconomic 
development and increase individual and societal welfare (Holzmann, Jorgensen 2000: 
2). Traditionally, people have shared risks informally in extended families or egalitarian 
                                                        
8 The terms (in)formal and (un)organized are used interchangeably and were first mentioned by the ILO in 
1972 (WB 2011). “The unorganised sector consists of all unincorporated private enterprises owned by 
individuals or households engaged in the sale and production (...) operated on a proprietary or partnership 
basis (...). Unorganised workers consist of those working in the unorganised enterprises or households, 
excluding regular workers with social security benefits, and the workers in the formal sector without any 
employment/social security benefits provided by the employers” (NCEUIS 2007: 3). 
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tribal systems. Yet, urbanization, declining fertility, and changing value systems are 
leading to “a break-down of (…) informal risk-sharing mechanisms” (Holzmann, 
Jorgensen 2000: 4). Holzmann and Jorgensen differentiate between SRM arrangements 
(informal, market-based, and public), SRM strategies (prevention, mitigation, and 
coping), and SRM instruments. The latter refers to the actual instruments that are chosen 
to match supply and demand (ibid: 3). According to this analytical differentiation, this 
study looks at NPS as an SRM arrangement but questions the scheme’s instruments to 
find out why the scheme does not match demand and supply.  
Studies on pensions in LDC have primarily focused on SRM arrangements. A 
prominent example is the WB’s promotion of five pillar pension systems (Holzmann, 
Hinz 2005: 1). SRM instruments, i.e. questions on implementation problems, create a 
relatively new research field (Asher, Bali 2010). Case studies on DC pensions in LDC 
primarily cover countries, which have pioneered the development of pension systems, 
such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. But these countries are of limited relevance for 
the case of India because these countries have larger formal sectors, covering 60 to 80 
percent of the workforce (Ginneken van 2003: 285). Most African and Asian countries 
with larger informal economies like India struggle more with the implementation of  
pension systems, and have rarely been at the center of social security research.  
This is the first study, which applies an analysis of both market forces to the case of 
low NPS coverage. Other studies applying this approach are not known. Based on the 
NPSS 2004, Butel and Bhardwaj have already analyzed the demand for NPS (Butel 2010; 
Butel, Bhardwaj 2010), which is a main reference for the analysis of the demand side in 
this study, particularly concerning the identification of market segments and their 
financial behavior. However, this study will partly interpret the NPSS in a different way 
than these authors and complement the demand analysis with further data.  
The following three sections define the analytical guidelines for this paper and the 
background of the research problem. Section II.1 develops a set of indicators and criteria 
to assess the implementation of such schemes. Section II.2 introduces the background of 
the NPS reforms in the context of the Indian pension system. And section II.3 provides a 
statistical description of the research problem.  
 
II Theoretical and Analytical Framework   7 
 
 
II.1 Framework to Analyze Coverage Gaps of DC Pensions in LDC 
There is no comprehensive theoretical background on functional mechanisms of 
implementation issues related to pensions. By collecting insights from other empirical 
studies, this study has tried to create a framework to analyze the implementation of 
voluntary DC pensions in LDC. According to James, two preconditions must prevail for 
the effective implementation of public DC pension schemes: (1) rudimentary capital 
markets and (2) considerable government regulations to prevent fraud and excessive risk 
(Sanyal 2011: 17 based on James 1997). Asher and Bali add five institutional and 
functional criteria such as that contributions are collected reliably, benefits are paid 
timely and correctly, the fund is managed in a financially secure way, records are kept 
accurately, and financial statements are produced to guarantee for transparency (Asher, 
Bali 2010: 49). India fulfills James’ basic criteria, and the PFRDA has implemented an 
institutional architecture that fulfills Asher’s and Bali’s criteria (Butel 2010) but still the 
NPS has not been implemented successfully (Sanyal 2011). That a scheme fulfills criteria 
to function from a pure institutional and financial point of view does not mean that it also 
attracts subscribers. Thus, there are further complex requirements for the implementation 
to become successful. “Successful implementation” should not only mean that the 
scheme works but that the scheme effectively attracts its target group to subscribe so that 
pension coverage is extended. Target groups of social protection in LDC are usually 
associated with the neediest (Suryahadi et al. 2010: 278). However, in contrast to the 
usual policies, which are publicly funded, voluntary DC schemes do not target the 
neediest as long as they do not have savings capacities. 
Rajan describes the process of implementing pensions in LDC as “a major issue of 
social engineering (…) [which] will require the construction of institutional bridges 
under conditions of limited resources and assets in a system in which public-private 
relationships wreak of distrust (…)” (Rajan 2008: 31). Similarly, Asher and Bali describe 
implementation as “a complex logistical task, even more so for (…) countries with large 
populations” (Asher, Bali 2010: 68). Thus, the implementation of such schemes in LDC 
is hindered by several conditions, including corruption, limited financial resources, 
poverty, and as in India the challenge of country and population size. Another vital 
condition is the aforementioned prevailing informality of work.  
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To better understand the functional mechanisms that influence the success of a DC 
pension scheme, it can be differentiated between the back-end and front-end of a scheme. 
Whereas the back-end includes the design of the institutional architecture of a scheme, 
how funds are managed, how records are kept, the front-end refers to the direct customer-
interface including aspects such as how and by whom the product is distributed, the 
enrollment process, and how a scheme is marketed (Interview Palacios 2011). Attraction 
of subscribers is back-end and heavily front-end driven. Of course, a subscriber has to be 
convinced by the investment scheme, and the scheme must function, for which Asher’s, 
Bali’s, and James’ criteria are vital. However, a subscriber must also be attracted by the 
scheme’s marketing and distribution channels. The subscriber’s demand and access to a 
scheme depend on conditions as they are described by Rajan.  
As a result, once James’, Asher’s, and Bali’s requirements are fulfilled, the all-
encompassing requirement for voluntary DC schemes to be implemented successfully is 
that the characteristics, which define and characterize the demand for pensions, have to 
be matched by the supply side of the pension scheme. Thus, this study approaches the 
research question for low coverage based on a comparative analysis of the NPS market 
forces. The analysis requires two different analytical tools comprising of indicators and 
criteria. First, indicators are necessary to guide the analysis of demand and supply. On 
the one hand, the indicators will define which aspects of the demand side are relevant for 
the design of the scheme. On the other hand, they will define which aspects of the supply 
side (the NPS) are necessary to analyze in order to assess, in a second step, how and why 
both sides do or do not match. Secondly, criteria are necessary to assess the degree to 
which demand and supply sides match and where policy options should be targeted to 
increase coverage. The following list of indicators and criteria serves as analytical 
framework for the analysis in the following chapters. 
  
A) Indicators of demand and supply: 
1) Demand:  
a) Demographics: For a basic picture of the NPS demand, data on the current and 
future age pyramid are relevant. Life expectancy is the most important demographic 
indicator because it is linked to the adequacy of the NPS retirement age. Data on 
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demographic characteristics of further sub-groups of the population such as scheduled 
castes and tribes is very relevant for social protection in general. That being said, these 
groups belong to the poorest and most disadvantaged segments in India and will not have 
the savings capacities for NPS as a contributory scheme (Deshpande 2000 and 2001; 
Borooah 2005). Thus, they can be neglected from the NPS demand analysis and should 
be targeted through publicly funded schemes, such as NOAPS.  
b) Labor market status, income, and savings capacities: There are two perspectives 
on the NPS market segments. First, the market could simply be defined in terms of labor 
market status, i.e. all workers who are not eligible to formal sector schemes. But only a 
certain share of this group is able to afford NPS that builds on workers’ contributions.  
Thus, a second perspective on savings capacities of this group is necessary to define 
potential market segments. The informal workforce is divergent in terms of income and 
savings capacities with important implications for the size of the NPS market segments. 
Finally, the development of labor market segments and real wages is relevant to getting 
an outlook on the future development of NPS market segments.  
c) Occupations and education: As shown in a study on Chile, the level of education 
correlates with the rate of participation in a voluntary pension scheme (Holzmann, 
Packard, Cuesta 2000: 22). The finding is so obvious that it would be surprising if 
education would have a different effect in India. Not only do the elderly require 
knowledge of the schemes and financial products that are offered (Asher, Bali 2010: 67), 
literacy is also required to master the bureaucratic act of enrolling in such a scheme. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze data on education of the NPS market segments. 
Occupations would provide important information for NPS distribution strategies and 
marketing approaches if they could be used as proxies for market segments. The 
indicators are coupled because it would be interesting to see whether occupational groups 
differ in levels of formal education. If occupations could be used as proxies for market 
segments, their educational levels would be relevant to assess how they would need to be 
approached.  
d) Residential area: 77 percent of the total Indian workforce lives in rural areas 
(Butel 2010: 110) but whether the majority of potential NPS customers live in rural areas, 
and how they are distributed across the 28 Indian states, needs to be investigated.   
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e) Language skills: English is the operating language of the Indian administration. 
Thus, it needs to be analyzed which languages are spoken by the majority in India, and in 
how far English can be used as the operating language in a pension scheme.  
f) Financial behavior and confidence in financial organizations: These indicators 
are highly relevant for the design of both the investment characteristics of NPS, and of 
the marketing approach. They will indicate the financial behavior, investment preferences 
of the market segments, and confidence in financial organizations. Thus, this analysis 
will show in how far marketing and distribution strategies can rely on financial literacy9 
and the existence of bank accounts, and if the market segments have already built 
confidence in financial institutions, which are the major distributors of NPS.  
2) Supply: 
a) Institutional architecture: Of primary interest are the institutions, which distribute 
the scheme, and those, which provide the annuities. These aspects can point to eventual 
failures of NPS including reasons why distribution channels underperform. Thus, it is 
vital to analyze the incentives for the distribution channels to enroll subscribers. 
Moreover, an unclear process of annuity-provision could be a reason that raises 
skepticism of potential subscribers.  
b) Investment rules: The rules and conditions of investments are one of the most 
relevant aspects to attract subscribers to a long-term saving scheme. Relevant 
characteristics include terms for withdrawals, investment choices, rate of return, tax 
treatment, and retirement age. However, NPS characteristics can only be assessed against 
the background of the demand in terms of financial behavior and investment priorities.  
c) Enrollment process: This indicator is relevant to understand the bureaucratic 
effort and transparency of the enrollment process, i.e. how complex are forms that have 
to be filled out, what is the operating language, and are their further charges and fees 
connected to enrollment.  
d) Pull Marketing: New voluntary products that require own contributions have to 
convince customers. Thus, it needs to be analyzed how PFRDA tries to attract potential 
subscribers; if and how the institution markets the scheme.    
 
                                                        
9 The “ability to make informed judgments and to take effective decisions regarding the use and 
management of money” (IIMS 2008a: 1). 
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B) Criteria for the assessment of voluntary DC pension market forces: 
1. Applying a holistic market perspective and developing a scheme that satisfies 
workers’ financial preferences: Participation in the NPS is voluntary and “will be 
driven entirely by consumer sentiment” (Butel 2010: 103). People have to actively decide 
to pay into an NPS account while they decide against other spending or saving options. 
Thus, in order to fulfill this criterion, NPS would need to offer what people demand in 
terms of investment conditions. In addition, NPS must be viewed as one of several long-
term saving options and put in the context of the Indian pension sector and its competing 
products. This means that NPS needs a higher rate of return, equal or better tax 
treatments, but it probably also needs to fulfill a high level of investment security, 
withdrawal possibilities, and flexibilities of contribution. The latter is important to 
incentivize poorer segments to participate because they witness greater uncertainties of 
income (Rusconi 2009: 72). 
2. Building confidence in long-term (political) stability and the feasibility of 
scheme and investment: With regard to social security and pensions, it is vital to take 
long-term perspectives of seven to eight decades into account to assess the stability of a 
scheme over a long period (Asher, Bali 2010: 68). Both the actual and perceived 
sustainability of investments must be taken into account because these policies require 
public trust in their long-term reliability. Hence, “considerations of political economy 
have to be part of system design and reform” (Holzmann, Jorgensen 2000: 24). On the 
one hand, this criterion requires that the financial burdens of the scheme are fiscally 
sustainable and politically accepted in the long run. On the other hand, this criterion 
requires that people who invest their own money can built the required confidence in the 
security of their investment for old age. The latter aspect points to the fact that the 
administration of a scheme such as NPS can actively built public confidence if certain 
requirements are fulfilled including a sound legal basis, institutionalized possibilities to 
voice grievances, as well as transparency of all rules and cash flows.  
3. Developing effective distribution channels and utilizing the private sector: In 
order to implement and deliver pension schemes, particularly in LDC, it is vital to utilize 
the comparative advantages of various actors including the private sector – especially of 
those with local expertise including municipalities, local NGOs, and think tanks. “They 
are characterized by different degrees of asymmetric information (…). All have different 
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advantages but none can provide perfect social risk management instruments.” 
(Holzmann, Jorgensen 2000: 26). The comparative advantages might change over time as 
markets develop, which should allow for changes of arrangements over time (ibid). Thus, 
according to Holzmann and Jorgensen, governments of LDC should act as regulator and 
supervisor but would ideally build on private experiences and infrastructure to deliver 
such instruments (ibid). Though the private sector might be an efficient distribution 
channel in general, their performance depends on three aspects: First, on the finding of 
effective incentives for organizations to perform; second, on people’s confidence in these 
organizations; and third, on the access of potential subscribers to these organizations.  
4. Implementing targeted and tailored (pull-) marketing approaches: Marketing 
of voluntary pension schemes in LDC is necessary to attract people for two reasons. First, 
the concept of pensions is not known to the majority and second, income in old age is not 
a primary concern of most people (Holzmann et al. 2000). Marketing theories 
differentiate between push and pull marketing strategies. Following a push strategy, the 
producer would “push” its products through distribution channels. The producer tries to 
convince companies, which should sell the product, with conditions that are so 
advantageous for the trading companies that selling the producer’s product becomes one 
of their priorities. This aspect is already covered in criterion 3. With a pull strategy, the 
producer tries to “pull the consumer towards the point of sale” (Buttle 1996: 3). Then, the 
producer’s marketing activities target the end consumer. In the case of NPS a targeted 
approach would consider consumer peculiarities including level of education, language 
skills, financial behavior etc.  
 Particularly pull-marketing raises administrative costs (Suryahadi et al. 2010: 281). 
Targeting efforts in general should be limited to a situation where welfare benefits still 
exceed economic costs. Unfortunately, this is difficult to measure and it is a question of 
political will and the priorities of the government.  
 
II.2 Development of the Public Pension System in India  
For a long time pension provision targeted only central and state government 
employees and formal sector workers based on financing through employer and 
employee participation (Swarup 2008: 2). Besides options offered by private and civil 
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society organizations, there were no pensions for the vast majority of the population, i.e. 
workers in the informal sector including the economically disadvantaged segments of the 
population. In the last decade, the GoI started a reform process towards a more 
comprehensive multi-tier pension system, which generally is the most effective option to 
meet the demands of various groups (Asher, Bali 2010: 64 f; Robalino, Holzmann 2009).  
The debate on the NPS reform process started in 1998 because the GoI wanted to 
improve the financial sustainability of the pensions for civil servants and to extend 
pension coverage to the informal sector (Swarup 2008; ADB 2003). In 1998, the Ministry 
of Welfare, later renamed the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MoSJE), 
commissioned the Invest India Microeconomic Foundation (IIEF) with the first 
comprehensive study on old age social and income security (“OASIS”). The GoI and 
IIEF set up an inter-ministerial OASIS Expert Committee (Mariathasan 2010: 24), which 
produced two final reports with concrete policy proposals. The OASIS Reports became 
the basis for the development of NPS. The PFRDA Bill provides the regulatory basis for 
the implementation of NPS for all citizens. Though the bill has not been passed by 
Parliament since 2005 (compare III.2), the NPS reforms have been implemented. Today, 
the Indian public pension system consists of four pillars10: 
The first pillar is the oldest one and includes the pensions for central and state 
government employees. Pensions were defined under the Directive Principles of State 
policy. The directive was amended in 2003 to implement the New Pension Scheme 
(NPS) in 2004, which meant a change from the formerly DB scheme into a DC scheme. 
Employees have to contribute a minimum of 10 percent (of salaries) and there is a 
matching 10 percent government contribution. Civil servants employed since 2004 have 
to enroll in the NPS. The old scheme still provides pensions for employees who joined 
the civil service prior to 2004. There are further special schemes for employees of the 
public enterprises Indian Railways, and India Post. (IIEF 2009) 
The second pillar comprises the pensions for formal sector employees. There are 
several schemes with different target groups: According to the EPF&MP Act 1952, the 
Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) compulsorily covers formal sector 
workers with monthly earnings of Indian Rupees [INR] 6,500 or less at firms with 20 or 
more members in defined industries. The two most important schemes managed by the 
                                                        
10 The four pillars are the author’s own description. The GoI does not differentiate between pillars.    
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EPFO are the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and the Employees Pension Scheme 
(EPS). The EPF was created in 1952 and has a DC rate of 16 percent and addresses 
workers with high salaries. The EPS is a DB-scheme and was introduced in 1995. It 
requires an employer’s contribution of 8.33 percent and includes a government-
contribution of 1.16 percent of the wage. “Firms not covered under EPFO may run their 
own pension and provident fund for the benefit of their employees subject to certain 
regulations” (OECD 2009: 84). There are special schemes for coal miners under the Coal 
mines PF&MP Act 1948, and for companies in defined industries under the Payment of 
Gratuity Act 1972. (IIEF 2009) 
The third pillar is a social pension, the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension 
Scheme (NOAPS), launched in 1995, for all persons below poverty line (BPL)11 aged 65 
and above (IIEF 2011; Old Age Solutions 2010). The pension amount consists of INR 
200 [3.18 €] per month from the central government plus smaller contributions by the 
state. For the 2011-12 budget, the finance minister proposed to reduce the eligibility age 
to 60 and to increase the GoI’s contribution to INR 500 [7.95 €] per month for those 
above 80 years (Asher 2011). “The NOAPS is known to have many problems in terms of 
coverage, targeting failures, inadequate payment levels and ineffective administration” 
(Butel 2010: 148 f.).  
The forth pillar includes voluntary DC pensions available to all citizens. In 1968 the 
GoI introduced the Public Provident Fund (PPF), which is not a typical pension 
scheme but a voluntary tax-advantaged DC saving option using personalized accounts. 
This scheme has been open to all citizens but since it uses income tax rebates as 
incentives for customers, it has mainly attracted formal sector workers, who pay income 
taxes (Siraj 2009). Annual contributions can range from INR 500 to 70,000 [from 8 to 
1109 €] and are tax-exempt. The GoI fixes the rate of interest annually, currently at eight 
percent (Madrasi 2011). Accounts can be opened at India Post and the State Bank of 
India. Withdrawals are possible after five years. Fifteen years of contributions give 
entitlement to a pension (India Post 1968). The combination of tax-exempt contributions 
                                                        
11 BPL is a need-testing tool for several social protection programs designed by the GoI. The last BPL 
Census (2002) involved 13 different criteria on asset ownership, education, occupation etc.. Based on 
scores, households are ranked per district and an individual cut-off score is applied with the result of a 
relative poverty and deprivation index (Dreze, Khera 2009: 3).  
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and easy withdrawal opportunities likely leads to the system being used for tax evasion 
by wage-earning, tax-paying individuals, and not for old-age provision.  
Since 1 May 2009, the NPS was extended and made available to all citizens. The 
reformed NPS particularly addresses the informal sector workforce. This NPS strand 
does not involve the 10 percent government contribution but in the Union Budget 2010-
11, the GoI introduced a temporary subsidy – the Swavalamban benefit - for informal 
sector workers. Moreover, PFRDA developed a second version of NPS that is NPS-Lite, 
which became available on 1 April 2010. NPS-Lite is a different way of distributing the 
scheme and it has different investment rules targeting economically disadvantaged 
persons. This NPS strand, including NPS-Lite, is the focal point of this paper. (Asher 
2003; Asher, Bali 2010; Swarup 2008; WB 2001) 
In addition to publicly provided schemes, there are micropensions offered by 
microfinance institutions, long-term saving options offered by banks, and pension 
schemes offered by insurance companies that provide the investor with a choice of funds 
(IIEF 2009). Among those private sector products, micropensions have gained 
considerable relevance in India, whereas the other two options are rarely distributed 
(Interview Bhardwaj 2011). Micropensions address the needs of very specific individual 
groups or local communities and design tailored solutions based on low contributions and 
low premium (Churchill 2006: 12). In terms of coverage the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) is one of the most successful examples. In 2009, 50,000 self-
employed women were enrolled in SEWA’s micro-pension scheme (Buisness Standard 
2009). As micropensions are solutions targeting only specific groups, they cannot be 
considered as a solution to cover masses of workers but can certainly considered as 
means to provide tailored social protection to the economically most disadvantaged.  
Several authors reveal that India lacks a comprehensive pension system (Bloom et al. 
2010; IIEF 2009). However, considering the described four pillars, this interpretation is 
not correct as the schemes potentially cover all different target groups in terms of sectors 
and industries quite comprehensively. Thus, it must be stressed that the problem of low 
pension coverage in India is not due to a lack of available schemes, and therefore it must 
be caused by implementation failures.  
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II.3 A Statistical Picture of the Policy Problem 
As measured by the NPSS 2004, on average around one third of the Indian 
workforce is unconfident that their children will financially take care of them in old age 
(Butel 2010: 141). But coverage of pension schemes is low in India. In 2007, an 
estimated 10.2 percent (= 37 million) of the projected 363 million paid Indian workforce 
aged 15 to 65 were enrolled in a pension scheme. This equals coverage of an estimated 
8.7 percent of the total workforce12. The remaining 388 million lack any form of formal 
pension coverage. Table 1 shows the coverage in millions with regard to the 
aforementioned public pension schemes plus estimates for private sector pensions. 
Formal sector pensions have by far the largest share.  
Table 1: Coverage of pension schemes in India (various years) 
 
Pension Scheme Coverage (in 
millions) 
Coverage Features 
EPFO*1  15,0 Compulsory, formal sector  
(180 defined industries) 
Formal sector coverage 
outside EPFO*2  
5,0 Compulsory, formal sector 
(e.g. coal miners, merchant navy) 
PPF*3  1.0 Voluntary; open to all citizens  
NOAPS*4  3.5 Social assistance for BPL persons 
NPS*5  1.4 Compulsory for civil servants; open to all 
citizens  
Previous civil servants 
pension scheme*6 
9.0 Compulsory for employees of the civil 
service that entered prior to 2004 
Private sector schemes 
including 
micropensions*7 
2.1 Voluntary 
Total   approx. 37.0  
(*1 Mariathasan 2011: 22; *2 OECD 2009: 84; *3 Butel 2010: 140 based on NPSS 2004; *4 Butel 2010: 
149; *5 Interview Nair 2011; *6 estimated based on Economist 2008; *7 no data available, estimated based 
on subtraction of 37 m. minus the other schemes) 
 
Voluntary pension products “have failed to capture a significant market” (Butel 
2010: 104). The NPS has been designed with the aim of changing the low coverage 
                                                        
12 There are different projections on the size of the workforce, e.g. Mariathasan projects 450 million 
(Mariathasan 2010: 22). Butel projected a size of 425 million „based on the actual population according to 
the 2001 Census, uprated by a 1.8% per annum growth factor” (WB estimate; Butel 2010: 119). For data 
consistency reasons, the study uses Butel’s projection.  
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situation, but it is far from performing better than the other schemes. About 1,417,588 
workers, including civil servants, have joined the scheme since May 2009 (Interview 
Nair 2011; data from 12 March 2011). About 90 percent of all subscribers are civil 
servants for whom the scheme is mandatory (ibid). Of the 1.4 million, 167,002 persons 
subscribed voluntary. Of the voluntary subscribers, 105,732 persons subscribed to NPS-
Lite (table 2). Thus, about 0.04 percent of the total workforce has voluntarily subscribed 
to NPS. Around 4.5 percent of all subscribers are formal sector workers (A. 6).  
Table 2: Number of NPS subscribers as of 12 March 2011 
 
 NPS for civil 
servants 
NPS for all 
citizens  
NPS-Lite for 
poor citizens 
All NPS 
pillars 
Number of branches - 8,894 20 -
Average number of 
subscribers per branch 
- 7 5,287 -
Total subscriptions  1,250,586 61,270 105,732 1,417,588
(Interview Nair 2010; Sanyal et al. 2011: 18; compare A. 6 for data on February) 
Subscriptions to the voluntary NPS for all citizens have increased at a constant but 
very slow pace. In contrast, NPS-Lite has witnessed a much higher enrollment rate in the 
last months and has overtaken the number of NPS subscriptions although NPS-Lite has 
been available since April 2010 and NPS since May 2009. On 7 February 2011, about 
two years after the launch of the scheme (not included in table 2), 42,982 workers have 
subscribed to NPS and 30,227 to NPS-Lite (PFRDA 2011; A. 6). About one month later 
on 12 March 2011, NPS-Lite suddenly had 75,505 subscribers more while NPS only 
received a few thousand new subscribers in the same period (Interview Nair 2011). 
Moreover, there is a considerable performance difference between the distribution 
channels of NPS and those of NPS-Lite (table 2). Each branch distributing NPS on 
average only managed to enroll seven persons compared to branches distributing NPS-
Lite that on average managed to enroll 5287 persons each. In summary, there is a general 
low coverage problem of NPS but the problem is more severe with regard to the 
“original” NPS compared to NPS-Lite.  
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III. Market Forces of the NPS  
The following chapter analyzes both market forces of the NPS scheme and builds 
on the analytical framework of Chapter II. Demand and supply are analyzed 
separately in sections III.1 and III.2. Based on the analysis of both market forces, the 
match of demand and supply is assessed in section III.3 to answer research question 1 
on the reasons for low NPS coverage.  
 
III.1 The Demand for Pensions in India  
The Indian workforce is a very heterogeneous group in terms of pension relevant 
indicators. In order to know the parameters to adequately improve NPS, it is 
necessary to get a better picture of the demand side. 
a) Demographics13 
The age pyramid of the Indian population has started changing from the typical 
pyramid of a rapidly growing population to a pyramid of a stationary population 
(Figure 1). The latter is characterized by relatively constant numbers up to age 50 
whereas afterwards mortality has “a larger effect” (Goldstein 2009: 11). A stationary 
population pyramid will be reached in the next two decades (ibid.).  
Figure 1: Population of India by age and sex: 1997 and 2020 
 
 
(Adlakha 1997: 1) 
                                                        
13 There is a data inadequacy because many people do not know their exact ages (Visaria 2000: 7). 
Although statisticians try to correct data by mathematical smoothing, there remains an certain error.  
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The pattern of aging in India has just started unfolding. In 2005, India reached the 
threshold according to which the UN defines a country as “aging”, i.e. at least seven 
percent of the population is 60 and older (Prakash 1999: 2). Thus, now is the right 
time for the GoI to approach pension policies for the majority of the workforce before 
the pressure of an aging population becomes more severe in the next two to three 
decades. In 2010, the median age is projected to be 25 years and is projected to rise to 
38.4 years in 2050 (UN 2008). The 60+ cohort is growing the fastest within the 
population. The number of the aged has risen by 300 percent from roughly 20 
million to about 80 million from 1950 to 2005 (Bhattacharya 2000: 5). In the next 10 
years, the share of elderly is projected to grow to 10 percent of the total population 
and to 20 percent in 2050, accordingly with 134.5 million elderly in 2020, 200 million 
in 2030, and 315.6 million in 2050 (UN 2008, Asher 2005: 14).  
Socioeconomic development has led to a rapidly increasing life expectancy at 
birth (LE(0)). For the period 1950 to 1955, the LE(0) was only 37.1 years for females 
and 38.7 years for males. Both have risen to 63.5 years for both sexes, 65 years for 
females and 62.1 years for males, in the period 2000 to 2005 and they are projected to 
further increase to 75.4 years for females and 71.4 years for males for 2045 to 2050, 
which has mainly been caused by decreasing infant mortality (UN 2008). However, 
LE depends on the financial status of the household (Mohanty, Ram 2010).  
Figure 2: Trends in life expectancy at birth by wealth quintiles 
 
(Mohanty, Ram 2010: 1) 
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Figure 2 shows that between 1992-93 and 2005-06, LE(0) has increased quite 
consistently for all wealth quintiles. That being said, a large gap has remained 
between the richest and the poorer and poorest. The decision to retire is not made at 
birth but rather at ages 25 to 40, when LE is higher than at birth, because mortality 
risks were overcome. There is no data on LE at later ages sorted by financial status, 
but the average life expectancy at age 30 (LE(30)) is 76.2 for females and 73.1 for 
males (WHO 2009). Conversely, the average LE(30) is shaped heavily by the poor 
masses, so this paper estimates that LE(30) of the poorer and poorest quintiles is at a 
maximum one to two years lower than the total average, around 73 years for both 
sexes. Women on average live longer and there is a so-called “feminization of the 
elderly”, which is an international trend. India had a male-female ratio of the elderly 
at age 65+ of 0.88 in 2001, i.e. 880 males for 1,000 females (Chan et al. 2010: 96). As 
LE has increased rapidly, most workers are used to having experienced deaths of 
people who were in their 50s or early 60s. Accordingly “IISS 2007 results show that 
this perception is still widespread with less than one in eight workers believing that 
they will survive into their seventies” (IIMS 2008: 2).  
There are large differences in the stages of the demographic transition between 
the states. Although the fertility rates of most states continue to be above 2.1 children 
per woman (TFR in Bihar of 4.0; in Uttar Pradesh of 3.8), some states already have 
fertility rates that compare to European countries. Karnataka (1.9), Kerala (1.7), and 
Tamil Nadu (1.7), for example, go hand in hand with higher LE (UN 2008).  
As a result of the demographic transition, there is a rising demand for old age 
security, particularly of women. The choice for an internationally used retirement age 
of 60 years of age would be reasonable considering the rapidly rising LE.  
 
b) Labor market status, income, and savings capacities 
About 85 percent (363 million) of the total workforce comprising 425 million 
persons receive earnings while the other 15 percent or 62 million are unpaid family 
workers. As shown in Figure 3, the 363 million earners are divided into 284 million 
informal sector workers and 79 million formal sector workers. The formal sector 
consists of 53 million earners, who belong to the target group of the EPFO, and 26 
million workers in small firms, who are excluded from EPFO coverage. Excluding 
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income, savings capacities, and coverage of workers by pension schemes other than 
EPFO-schemes, as shown in Figure 3, the NPS market encompasses 284 million 
informal sector workers, 62 million unpaid family workers, who could also be 
counted as informal workers, and 26 million formal sector workers, who are not 
eligible for EPFO, which equals 372 million persons, i.e. 87.5 percent of the total 
labor force. (Butel 2010: 109) 
Figure 3: Potential NPS market share based on labor market status 
 
(Own illustration based on NPSS 2004, see also Butel 2010: 109 ff.) 
With NPS being a DC scheme, its potential market is limited to those workers 
who can pay the contribution for a sufficient amount of time so that enough pension 
claims can be accumulated. This excludes 18 percent of the informal sector that are 
unpaid family workers and the chronically unemployed (Butel 2010: 103 f.). The 
ADB undertook a conservative and realistic baseline study for the GoI to segment the 
pension market based on the assumption that there would be no subsidies for 
contributors and that contributors would have to bear all administrative costs for 
commercial partners (Butel 2010).14 It is based on the NPSS 2004 and assumes that 
pension contributions are sourced either in real earnings, reduced personal/household 
expenditure, or in the redirection of existing savings (ibid). Moreover, the survey only 
included the age cohort 30-50. While the survey assumes that those 50+ do not have 
                                                        
14 IIMS came up with an estimation on the private pension market: “(…) with up to an estimated eight 
crore [= 80 million] workers ready to participate” (IIMS 2008: 2). The report concludes, “the average 
annual bank savings of individuals with bank accounts at Rupees 39,000 [619 €] suggests that (...) the 
group can easily support regular and meaningful pension contributions” (IIMS 2008: 117). But the 
conclusion is overly simplistic because the average bank savings will likely be shaped drastically by a 
very small number of very wealthy persons.  
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enough time to collect enough money, “younger workers incomes are likely on 
average to be unrepresentatively low” (Butel 2010: 105). The real potential market is 
probably larger because a certain share of people under 30 years of age might be 
interested in a pension scheme.  
The NPSS “asked respondents to indicate what part of their present discretionary 
expenditure they could harvest for other purposes if they felt there was good reason to 
do so” (ibid), which indicates the potential pension market if these people could be 
convinced to invest in a pension scheme. Figure 4 shows the annual savings capacities 
of NPSS 2004 respondents. In all categories, workers in urban areas have higher 
savings capacities than the rural counterparts. Average annual capacities of INR 
10,747 [170.33 €] appear surprisingly high for all earners.  
 
Figure 4: Annual savings capacities 
 
(Butel 2010: 60) 
 
Based on the findings on available discretionary expenditure, the study calculated 
the potential pensions that contributors could expect with the NPS assuming that they 
pay into the scheme on a monthly basis over the full period of membership (Butel 
2010: 107). However, in reality people will probably be willing to invest only a 
certain fraction of their actual savings capacities in a pension scheme. Figure 5 shows 
how the 372 million individuals in Figure 3 can be divided into five market segments.  
Market segment 5 consists of 242 million persons. The majority of them are the 
least likely able to afford NPS because they do not have savings capacities.15 Market 
                                                        
15 However, due to the statistical approach, this group includes all persons, who based on their savings 
capapcities would belong to the other market segments but who were excluded there because they only 
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segments 1 to 4 total 130 million workers aged 30 to 50 who would be able to 
purchase some annuities. Yet, out of these 130 million only 40 million would be able 
to collect annuities high enough to live above the national poverty level16 after 
retirement (market segment 2). Included in the 40 million are also 1.34 million 
formal sector salaried workers in small firms, who are excluded from EPFO (A.2). 
Overall, 40 percent of the respondents expressed keen interest in NPS. With regard to 
the 40 million who are able to afford NPS and annuities of at least poverty line level, 
19.5 million expressed keen interest in NPS (market segment 1). Another 40 million 
could collect annuities high enough to live on a level of 80 to 100 percent of the 
national poverty level (market segment 3; Butel 2010: 106).  
Figure 5: Potential NPS market segmentation based on savings capacities 
 
(Own illustration based on NPSS 2004, see also Butel 2010: 109 ff.) 
 
According to Bhardwaj, with the expectation of rising incomes market segments 
1 to 3, comprising of 80 million persons, are potential NPS customers in the short- to 
medium-term (Interview Bhardwaj 2011). The expectation of rising incomes, 
however, is quite unrealistic. As shown in A. 8, trends in real wages of both male and 
female casual workers in urban areas declined slightly in 2004-2005 compared to 
                                                                                                                                                               
include respondents in the age group 30-50. All workers between 15 to 30 and 50 to 65 years of age, 
are included in the 242 million.  
16 Measurement of the poverty level is based on statistics from 2000 (Butel 2010: 106). The GoI 
defines  “poverty line for the urban areas is Rs. 296 per month and for rural areas Rs. 276 per month, 
i.e. people in India who earn less than Rs. 10 per day. As per GOI, this amount will buy food 
equivalent to 2200 calories per day (...)” (India Watch 2010). 
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1999-2000. In the formal sector, real wages have increased slightly for male rural 
workers in the same period by approximately INR 4 [0.06 €] per day but decreased 
remarkably for rural females by INR 20 [0.32 €] and slightly for urban females (ibid; 
Appendix 8). This development “is truly remarkable for a country in which real GDP 
has been growing at an average rate of 8 percent over this period, and where much of 
this growth has been concentrated in urban areas” (Ghosh 2011: 146). As 
developments of wages differ so much with regard to gender and location it is 
unrealistic to expect real wages to go up just because of GDP development. As a 
result, a realistic NPS market rather consists of market segments 1 and 2.   
Thus, NPS is not a pension scheme that could be afforded by those at the very 
bottom of the income distribution, in particular women and scheduled castes and 
tribes. Elderly women living in urban areas are a very vulnerable group. According to 
the NSS survey of 1993 to 1994, 64 percent of elderly females in urban areas 
categorized themselves as fully dependent with regard to food, clothing, and health 
care in contrast to 46 percent of men, 58 percent of females in rural areas, and 45 
percent of males in rural areas (Rajan 2006: 13). Elderly females have the highest 
demand for social security (Asher 2009: 7). Conversely, women are not the major 
target group of the NPS approach because they have much less discretionary income 
that could be invested in a pension scheme. Since the suppression of women is all-
encompassing in the Indian society, it is important to focus on female empowerment 
on a much broader footing. The same applies to scheduled castes and tribes.  
 
c) Occupations and Education 
The rapid development of the Indian economy has been based on a very small 
knowledge and IT-intensive fraction of the economy. Due to a lack of structural 
economic change, the vast majority of the population has to continue work in low 
productivity, low-paid activities (Ghosh 2011: 126). The Indian economy is still an 
agricultural economy with 60 percent of the workforce employed in this sector 
although this sector is responsible for only 20 percent of the GDP (ibid). According to 
the NPS 2004 Survey and in line with the described macro-economic development, 70 
percent of the 19.5 million persons in market segment 1 belong to only three 
occupational categories: traditional and merchandised farmers (26.6 percent; 5.2 
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million persons), small retailers (27.4 percent; 5.3 million persons), and self-
employed persons (15.6 percent; 3 million persons) (Figure 6, A. 2). Unfortunately, 
this categorization is not clear-cut since most of the retail workers are also self-
employed and there is no information on the definition of the category of self-
employed versus self-employed in other categories.  
         
Figure 6: Occupations in market segment 1 
 
 
(Own illustration based on NPSS 2004, Butel 2010: 113) 
 
Surprisingly, although the incomes of traditional farmers, in contrast to the 
incomes of merchandised farmers, belong to the lower income ranges, their savings 
capacities are broadly similar to the savings capacities of other occupational groups 
with higher average incomes (Butel 2010: 116). In terms of education, both traditional 
and merchandised farmers belong to a rather uneducated group in terms of formal 
education. Less than 30 percent have completed at least primary education, while 80 
percent of the rest are illiterate (Butel 2010: 116). This fact, in particular, poses major 
challenges to finding a strategy towards approaching this group.  
The small retailers can be divided into 70 retailing categories. However, more 
than half of them belong to six types: “grocery and general stores, clothing and 
footwear stores, household items, shops, certain street vendors and eateries of various 
kinds” (Butel 2010: 117; A. 3). On average, small retailers have a minimum of 
primary education and belong to medium income ranges with some exceptions, such 
as the grocers, who have higher incomes but same savings capacities as the average in 
market segments 1 and 2 (Butel 2010: 119). 
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Self-employed workers are the broadest group with 57 sub-occupational 
categories. Sixty-five percent of the self-employed group belongs to only five sub-
occupational categories.17 Because the economy does not generate enough paid jobs, 
the number of self-employed workers, who account for more than half of the current 
workforce, is rising (Ghosh 2011: 127). The development is most evident for two-
thirds of all rural women, who are self-employed (Ghosh 2011: 141).   
Literacy has improved in the last decades. The adult literacy rate for the age 
cohort 15+ has increased from 34 percent in 1971 to 52 percent in 1995. Yet, female 
literacy is much lower than male literacy, 38 versus 66 percent respectively (Adlakha 
1997: 7). According to the 2005-06 National Family Health Survey, 79 percent of 
elderly females reported to have no education at all, compared to 46 percent of elderly 
males (NFHS 3: 28). However, since levels of education increase for younger 
generations, the elderly of the next generations will have higher levels of literacy and 
education and at least this access barrier will likely be overcome in the long run.  
In summary, occupations could provide a useful proxy for market segments 
thinking of NPS and distribution strategies. Appropriate ways to reach farmers and 
self-employed would cover almost the entire workforce. But one of the biggest 
challenges will be the coverage of farmers because of their high illiteracy rates that is 
apparent even in the wealthier market segments 1 and 2.  
 
d) Residential area 
With regard to the 80 million persons who are able to afford annuities of at least 
80 percent poverty line level, according to the ADB study they are slightly more 
likely to live in rural than in urban areas (Butel 2010: 110). But market segment 1 has 
an urban focus with regard to the retailers and the self-employed, which obviously 
does not apply to the large group of farmers.  
Persons belonging to the three most prevalent occupational groups in market 
segments 1 and 2 can be especially found in three of the 28 Indian states, Rajasthan, 
                                                        
17 (1) Commission-based agents, including timber, and livestock auctioneers, insurance and real estate 
agents, (2) self-employed professionals, including doctors, lawyers, architects, and civil engineers, (3) 
residential building contractors involved with household construction and repairs, (4) certain categories 
of transport workers concerned mainly with the provision of passenger services, and (5) home-based 
workers providing household laundry, cabinet making, and beautician services (Butel 2010: 124).  
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Gujarat, and Karnataka. In Rajasthan and Gujarat, there is an outstandingly high 
probability of one in nine households that includes a person who belongs to the three 
occupational groups in market segments 1 or 2. The state Karnataka has a ratio of one 
in 12 households (Butel 2010: 136; Appendix 5). This is relevant information for the 
analysis of policy recommendations in Chapter IV because these three states could be 
used for pilot projects to test reforms of the NPS system when they target market 
segments 1 and 2 (Butel 2010: 137). Effects of eventual pilot projects should quickly 
become apparent in these states.   
As shown in A. 5, there are also some states where almost no worker belonging 
to market segments 1 or 2 lives, including Annachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal 
Pradesh, and Uttarainchal. As NPS marketing and distribution efforts will only be of 
very limited success in these states, it would be reasonable but politically 
controversial to limit the activities in these states only to a minimum. Instead, it could 
be tried to intensify social- and micropension efforts in these states until data show 
that living standards increased and that there are people who can afford NPS.   
 
e) Language skills  
The most widely spoken common language in India is Hindi, which is spoken by 
almost 70 percent of the respondents to the NPSS 2004 (read and write ca. 50 percent) 
with slightly higher levels in urban than in rural areas. Most people - 98.2 percent of 
the respondents to the NPSS 2004 (read: 73.2 percent; write: 72 percent) - speak their 
individual local languages (Butel 2010: 54). “English is only 44th on the list of 
languages in India with the most native speakers” (Azam et al. 2010: 3). According to 
the India Human Development Survey 2005, one in five Indians “report having the 
ability to speak English, comprised of 4% who can converse fluently in English and 
16% who can converse a little in English” (Azam et al. 2010: 5). English speaking 
skills are better among younger, better-educated, higher castes, and male persons 
(ibid). There is no language data for the persons in market segments 1 and 2 but, 
based on the three major occupational groups, an English language pension scheme 
would not work for most of farmers. For the other two groups, it is difficult to 
estimate their English abilities. Certainly, the limitation to the English language, 
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which is the language of policy makers and civil servants in India, would exclude 
maybe even the majority of the target group.  
 
f) Financial behavior and confidence in financial organizations 
Saving preferences have been shaped by short time horizons because most 
workers have irregular incomes and limited savings capacities (Interview Bhardwaj 
2011). For instance, 36.6 percent of respondents in the NPSS saved for the marriage 
of their children (Butel 2010: 62), but only 31 percent of all respondents saved for old 
age security (ibid). A first sign for the development towards more long-term oriented 
savings is that “significant numbers of upper income workers are presently investing 
in insurance endowment policies” (Butel 2010: 129). On average, 64.5 percent of all 
earners with relatively equal percentages for all occupational groups in the age cohort 
30 to 50 have not thought about retirement at all (Butel 2010: 69).18  
As shown in Table 2, on average less than one quarter of persons in market 
segments 1 and 2 have no bank account at all, which can be translated into a relatively 
high rate of financial literacy in the two wealthiest market segments.  
Table 3: Relations of potential NPS customers in market segments 1 and 2 with 
other financial institutions  
 
(Butel 2010: 142) 
Highly frequented financial institutions are nationalized banks, India Post, and 
life insurers, while the major life insurer LIC has the highest market share of all life 
                                                        
18 Only 6.2 percent are “consciously preparing for retirement”, 7.2 percent are “not preparing but 
expecting to retire”, and 22.1 percent are “neither preparing nor expecting to retire”. The only outliers 
are civil servants, who are enrolled in a compulsory pension scheme (Butel 2010: 69). 
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insurers. Farmers are the only occupational group that also tends to bank with rural 
banks. Private banks have a relatively low market share in all groups. 
The radar diagram in Figure 7 shows the results for the respondents’ degree of 
confidence in different financial institutions on a scale from 1 (“definitely will trust 
them with my money”) to 4 (“definitely won’t trust them with my money”) (Butel, 
Bhardwaj 2010: 66). According to the findings, urban and rural respondents had very 
similar perceptions. Respondents fully trust in the LIC, nationalized banks, and India 
Post. There are relatively low levels of trust in most other institutions, including 
private banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies other than the LIC (ibid). The 
IISS 2007 shows that confidence in all institutions decreases for lower income groups, 
which is pronounced for Indian private banks, and mutual funds (IISS 2007: 16).   
Figure 7: Degree of confidence in financial institutions 
 
(Butel/Bhardwaj 2010: 66) 
Recalling Table 2, one quarter of even the wealthiest market segments 1 and 2 on 
average do not have bank accounts or insurance contracts at all. Thus, confidence 
decreases with lower incomes, and lacking experience with financial institutions. As 
shown in A. 9, most people lack an opinion on the riskiness of modern financial 
products. In contrast, people are able to assess the riskiness of classical investment 
that they are familiar with, including precious metals, and agricultural land. Hence, 
low trust in private banks, for instance, does not mean that people would not 
cooperate with these institutions when they are used as NPS distributors. Rather it 
appears to mean that there is a high degree of unfamiliarity leading to natural 
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skepticism but that there would be ways to build up confidence by raising financial 
literacy and developing adequate campaigns. 
The majority of respondents are highly risk-averse.19 On average 76 percent of all 
workers favor safe investments over high returns. Farmers, at 76.4 percent, were the 
most risk-averse group. (Butel 2010: 71) Respondents were also asked how they 
perceive the features of NPS on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning “total acceptability”, 
4 “not acceptable”, and 5 “don’t know”. The findings are shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 8: Acceptability of NPS features 
 
 
(Butel, Bhardwaj 2010: 74) 
 
 
According to this survey, the major features of NPS appear to be very acceptable 
to the respondents with similar levels in urban and rural areas (Butel, Bhardwaj 2010: 
75). The positive survey result, however, might be caused by the fact that the 
questionnaire did not formulate any of the more critical NPS points clearly, i.e. that it 
is not possible to withdraw full investments prior to retirement and that there is no 
guarantee on rates of return or on a minimum pension (compare III.2).  
 
                                                        
19 Priorities for risks versus returns were tested based on three hypothetical choices. Choice 1: “You 
have Rs.1000 to investment and in one year’s time, it may grow to Rs.2000 but you may also lose 
money and get back only Rs.500.” Choice 2: “You have Rs.1000 to investment and in one year’s time, 
it may grow to Rs.1200 but you may also lose money and get back only Rs.800.” Choice 3: “You have 
Rs.1000 to investment and in one year’s time, it will grow to Rs.1050 and you will not lose any 
money.” (Butel 2010: 71) 
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III.2 The NPS Supply Side   
The NPS has a simple concept. Subscribers open an NPS account and contribute 
money during their working age. This money is invested according to their 
preferences and at the point of retirement, subscribers withdraw their investment to 
buy annuities, which will then provide for a monthly pension until they die.  
 
a) Institutional architecture  
The Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoLE) is responsible for the NPS while 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is involved with all pension schemes (IIEF 2005). The 
NPS architecture itself consists of PFRDA, the National Securities Depository 
Limited (NSDL), which is the Central Recordkeeping Agency (CRA), competing 
pension fund managers (PFM), Points of Presence (PoPs) and aggregators. 
PFRDA is the new pension regulation authority. The agency is still awaiting 
parliamentary approval of the PFRDA Bill from 2005, which defines the authority’s 
responsibilities and the NPS architecture. Left parties have opposed the bill because 
the savings of the poor should not be “subjected to the greed of the private sector” and 
because the scheme would not provide enough securities for poor people’s savings 
(Dave 2006: 14). The non-adoption of the bill has consequences for the legal status of 
the whole NPS regulation, as outlined in the “Registration of Intermediaries 
Regulations”, which can be finalized and notified only after the PFRDA Bill is passed 
(PFRDA 2005). Once the bill is passed, PFRDA will not only regulate and develop 
NPS but becomes responsible for the whole Indian pension sector including all 
pension schemes described in chapter II.2. The idea was the creation of one institution 
that has enough leeway to develop a comprehensive pension system (Swarup 2009). 
According to Swarup, the bill will be reintroduced in the parliamentary session in 
2011 (Mariathasan 2011: 24). .  
Despite the lack of formal legislation, PFRDA was allowed to start implementing 
NPS. PFRDA regulates, supervises, and develops the NPS architecture and all its 
intermediaries (Swarup 2008: 9), which are described in the following paragraph. As 
argued by Jain, this all-embracing PFRDA mission leads to conflicting interests 
(Interview Jain 2011). The performance of the private sector is vital for the success of 
PFRDA. Hence, its supervision might not be taken seriously. As long as there are no 
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public scandals about PFRDA not properly supervising the NPS architecture, this 
institutional design does not adversely affect NPS enrollments. Nevertheless, this 
situation of conflicting institutional interests is a weak point of PFRDA’s public 
standing and the trust of experts like Jain in PFRDA. This conflict could only be 
solved by institutionally dividing regulation and supervision of the sector. 
 In detail, the PFRDA regulates and supervises the following intermediaries:  
The National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL) was appointed as the 
Central Record Keeping Agency (CRA). The tasks of the authority include issuing 
account numbers, recording data of the customers, providing annual account 
statements, and all other relevant information via modern technical devices including 
SMS and online accounts. (PFRDA 2009) 
Six Pension Fund Managers (PFMs) invest retirement assets in line with 
investment guidelines issued by PFRDA. NPS follows the rationale that returns will 
be higher if several fund managers compete for rates of return. (PFRDA 2009: 241)  
Annuity Service Providers (ASPs) will deliver the regular monthly pension. 
Once subscribers decide to retire, they have to buy annuities from their investment at 
an ASP (ICICI Bank 2010). Annuities generate “fixed monthly (periodic) income 
which a subscriber will get against the corpus invested” (PFRDA 2009: 258). The size 
of the annuity depends on the corpus size. PFRDA is currently nominating the ASPs 
(Interview Nair 2011). Surprisingly, this did not happen before NPS was opened to 
subscribers, who likely want to know how they receive their pensions.  
The Trustee Bank, which is the State Bank of India, has to take care of the funds 
under the NPS and the Board of Trustees is the registered owner of all NPS assets. 
The Trustee Bank facilitates the transfers across all entities of the NPS system, e.g. 
between PoP and PFM, PoP and ASP. It has to issue fund receipts and confirmations 
to CRA and reconcile funds with CRA (PFRDA 2009: 239).  
“Points of Presence” (PoPs) are the service-providers for NPS subscribers. They 
are financial sector institutions such as banks or insurance companies, which are 
licensed by PFRDA to become PoPs. The tasks that PFRDA subscribes to PoPs 
include enrollment of subscribers, receiving of instructions including changing 
subscriber details investment schemes, and contributions of subscribers, which they 
have to submit to CRA, as well as the paying out of benefits to subscribers (PFRDA 
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2009: 239). PoPs are electronically connected, which ensures the portability of NPS 
accounts so that subscribers can easily switch PoPs (Swarup 2008: 7 f.). The choice 
for this distribution channel follows the rationale of utilizing an existing network of 
financial institutions for two reasons. First, they provide for the necessary 
infrastructure to conduct service provision in terms of both staff and technology. 
Second, the fact that contracted institutions already have customer relations provides 
cross-selling opportunities. (Interview Jain 2011) 
A.10 shows the list of PoPs, including the State Bank of India, several regional 
state banks, private banks, and the LIC. In February 2011, there were 8,894 PoPs 
operating in the whole country (PFRDA 2011 b). This number appears to sufficiently 
provide for an adequate level of coverage as long as the PoPs are evenly distributed so 
that there is access in all regions where persons in market segments 1 or 2 live 
(compare III.2d). Yet, most of the banks are more present in cities. Recalling Butel’s 
analysis of the coverage of financial institutions even with regard to market segment 
1, 19 percent of this relatively wealthy group cannot be reached directly by the PoPs 
(Butel 2010: 141). But as not all Indian banks are PoPs the actual number of persons 
in market segment 1 that is covered by PoPs is certainly smaller than the remaining 81 
percent (15.8 million). Since market segment 1 is the richer part of the population, 
PoP coverage of the other segments is likely much lower.  
PoPs receive a monetary benefit per subscriber. In February 2011, PFRDA 
decided to increase the incentive from INR 50 to INR 150 [2.77 €] per subscriber for 
the current financial year (PFRDA 2011 c). PFRDA wants to incentivize PoPs to 
intensify the promotion of NPS (ibid). But still an interviewed PoP mentioned that the 
financial incentives were too low to intensively promote NPS and that they can only 
provide a basic NPS service on this level (Interview Ragunathan 2011). Even the 
annual maintenance charge for NPS is higher than the one-time charge for the PoP (an 
overview about the charges follows in C and in A. 13). The rationale of cross-selling 
is not free of conflicts because there is certain competition between NPS and the 
ordinary products of PoPs, which is intensified due to fraud incentives for PoPs 
(Interview Bhardwaj 2011). PoPs can easily channel persons who might be interested 
in NPS to other saving options and to their own products. According to Bhardwaj, this 
particularly applies to the richer segments because PoPs make more money when they 
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sell them their own products. The NPS flat charges will make more sense for PoPs 
when they receive them for poorer customers (ibid.).  
Aggregators are only part of the NPS architecture in the NPS-Lite version, 
which was operationalized by CRA from 1 April 2010 (PFRDA 2010). NPS-Lite is a 
different way of distributing the scheme and conducting acquisitions specifically 
targeting economically disadvantaged persons. The definition of this group is not 
specified by PFRDA and it refers to anybody who makes contributions up to INR 
50,000 [793 €] p.a. (PFRDA 2010). The idea is to conduct enrollments on a group 
basis through institutions – mainly non-profit NGOs – that already have contacts to 
the economically disadvantaged. In the case of NPS-Lite, the aggregator becomes the 
“main interface between the NPS-Lite subscriber and NPS architecture” (PFRDA 2010: 
3). Individuals open the account through the aggregator and get an individual NPS-
Lite account. Instead of PoPs, aggregators become the service provider for NPS-Lite 
subscribers and aggregators conduct the enrollments with CRA (PFRDA 2010: 7).20 
Hence, they have the same responsibilities as PoPs in the “normal” NPS architecture. 
The rationale is twofold. First, economies of scale are utilized in the enrollment 
process. Individual enrollments are more expensive for PFRDA and time-consuming. 
Group enrollments reduce administrative and transactional costs, in particular fees 
and charges, which makes smaller investments more viable. Second, when it comes to 
the economically disadvantaged who are not used to long term saving and banking, 
there are better outcomes with group enrollments due to the group dynamics. People 
share experiences and become more willing to take risks when they see that others do 
the same (Interview Bhardwaj 2011).   
Any PoP can become an aggregator, as well as NGOs, self-help groups, or any 
other organization that fulfills standards as prescribed by PFRDA, such as having 
trained staff and fulfilling the “capability to manage large customer” (PFRDA 2010: 5 
ff.; PFRDA 2010 a: 1). On 18 March 2011, 20 aggregators have been registered under 
NPS-Lite since April 2010 (Interview Nair 2011; full list in A. 11). There are several 
large organizations with numerous clients. For instance, SEWA had 1,256,944 
members in 12 states in 2009. Since 2006, it offers its own micropension scheme 
                                                        
20 There are clear roles and procedures for aggregators, i.e. they have to install an oversight office, an 
account office, and a collection center, which should guarantee smooth functioning but, for the purpose 
of this paper, these details are not relevant to understanding the NPS supply side. Further information 
can be found in PFRDA 2011 f.  
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(SEWA 2011). According to Nair, SEWA became interested in NPS because of the 
Swavalamban subsidy and it also wanted to offer NPS-Lite to its members. SEWA is 
currently considering if it could transfer its 50,000 own micropension accounts 
(Buisness Standard 2009) to NPS-Lite (Interview Nair 2011).21 PFRDA also 
appointed several organizations of informal sector workers such as the Karnataka 
Unorganized Workers Social Security Board, and the Construction Worker Welfare 
Board in Hyderabad. Welfare boards22 are very promising aggregators as they already 
support their members in the area of social protection (Interview Jain 2011).  
While PoPs focus on market segments 1 and 2, aggregators appear to be the more 
appropriate distribution channel to focus on economically weaker segments 3 and 4. 
Coming back to the different performance of PoPs and aggregators as described in 
Chapter II.3, it is remarkable that NPS-Lite has become more successful in a few 
months than the “original” NPS. There are two major differences in the functional 
mechanisms of both distribution channels, which cause the different performance of 
aggregators and PoPs. First, PFRDA designed a more effective incentive scheme for 
aggregators compared to the one for PoPs. For aggregators, the incentive amount 
increases with higher performance based on large-scale enrollments as shown in 
Table 4 whereas PoPs receive a flat rate per subscriber. In addition, this financial 
incentive scheme does not seem to be their only intention at least not of all 
aggregators as the case of SEWA shows, where the concern to provide better social 
benefits to its members additionally improved performance.  
Table 4: Incentive scheme for aggregators 
 
No of subscribers under aggregator* Per capita incentive 
Above 100,000 INR 10 [0.16 €] 
Above 300,000 INR 17 [0.26 €] 
Above 500,000 INR 22 [0.34 €] 
*As defined under section 15.3 of regulations. This would be applicable 
only for new and active acquisitions during the year under consideration. 
(PFRDA 2010c: 3)  
                                                        
21 Other large aggregators include Alankit, a financial services organization with 15 million customers 
and 18 regional offices in several states, Bandhan Microfinance, which targets women and has 3.3 
million clients and 1,553 branches in 18 states, and the Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty, 
which offers financial services to farmers. 
22 The GoI established welfare funds for several typical informal sector occupations. They are financed 
through contributions from employers, workers, and the government. Welfare boards administer the 
funds, which are invested in social protection programs for their members (Interview Jain 2011).  
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Second, aggregators approach their target groups in a more tailored way 
whereas PoPs only wait for customers to ask for NPS. For instance, the aggregator 
IFMR (Institute for Financial Management and Research) directly approaches their 
customers in rural areas, who on average have “very limited education and no 
knowledge about pensions” (Interview Chaudhary 2011). Aggregators do not only 
promote NPS-Lite and hand out enrollment forms but actively offer financial 
consultancy so that people get the impression that they are not left alone with their 
investment decisions. Chaudhary describes the IFMR proceedings as follows: “Our 
wealth managers (…) talk to households about their plans and financial goals, which 
include retirement plans and how much they need to save to maintain the same 
lifestyle. Post this we explain them the product features of NPS-Lite (…)” (Interview 
Chaudhary 2011). PoPs offer the same service but only after people actively ask for it, 
which certainly represents a higher access barrier for most persons, especially since 
confidence in private financial institutions is low as shown in Chapter III.1. However, 
it cannot be expected that these 20 aggregators continue to perform on this level 
because they have their own missions and a fixed number of clients. Aggregators will 
likely not be able to extend their outreach heavily only to distribute NPS-Lite.  
  
b) Investment rules 
There are two types of accounts, Tier-I and Tier-2. Tier-1 is practically non-
withdrawable. Subscribers can withdraw only 20 percent of their invested money 
before 60 and they have to invest the remaining 80 percent in an annuity. At age 60, 
subscribers have to invest at least 40 percent in an annuity; the remaining can be 
withdrawn in lump sum or in a phased manner between ages 60 and 70 (OneMint 
2010). There is a minimum contribution rate of INR 500 [7.95 €] for Tier-1 accounts 
per contribution, subscribers have to make at least one contribution p.a., and they 
need to contribute a minimum of INR 6,000 p.a. [95.40 €] (PFRDA 2009: 250; 271). 
Tier-2 is a voluntary add-on to Tier-1 accounts. Investments can always be 
withdrawn from this account (PFRDA 2009: 241). Subscribers must make at least one 
contribution p.a. and keep a minimum balance at the end of the year of INR 2,000 
[31.64 €]. Non-compliance results in a penalty of INR 100 [1.57 €] p.a. The account 
will be closed when the values become zero (IMYIDEAS 2010). Transfers are only 
possible from Tier-2 to Tier-1 (PFRDA 2009). NPS-Lite accounts only have the 
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Tier-1 option but without a minimum contribution and with a maximum of INR 
50,000 [793 €] total annual investment (PFRDA 2010 a: 1). In view of the average 
annual savings capacities of INR 10,747 [168.22 €] of all earners (Figure 4, p. 24), the 
limit of the maximum investment appears high for a scheme targeting economically 
disadvantaged. Tier-1 withdrawal and retirement rules also apply to NPS-Lite.  
The Swavalamban Yojana Scheme was announced in the Union Budget 2010-
11. The scheme is a subsidy to support the economically disadvantaged segments. The 
GoI contributes INR 1,000 [15.9 €] per year to each NPS/NPS-Lite account opened in 
the years 2009 to 2012 and for the next five years (Financial Chronicle 2011). 
The benefit is available to persons who join NPS/NPS-Lite with a minimum 
contribution of INR 1,00023 and a maximum contribution of Rs 12,000 [190.8 €] p.a., 
provided the subscriber is not in regular government employment, and is not covered 
by any other social security scheme. Eligibility is not additionally tested on a needs 
basis so that the policy practically also subsidizes wealthier persons. Swavalamban 
benefits are credited directly into the subscriber’s account (Interview Nair 2011).  
There are two investment choices for subscribers. The PFMs invest in three 
classes: E (equity), G (government securities), and C (credit risk bearing fixed income 
instruments). First, subscribers have to choose one of the six PFMs for managing their 
investment. Second, they have to choose between an “auto choice” and an “active 
choice” investment option. In the “auto choice” mode, PFMs will invest according to 
the rule: the older the person, the more secure and conservative the investment has to 
be. This enables novices to circumvent difficult investment choices (Sanyal et al. 
2011: 17). “Active choice” means subscribers indicate the percentage share of the 
three available asset classes. There is a portfolio restriction on a maximum of 50 
percent investment in equity. (PFRDA 2009) 
The rate of return is not guaranteed. The authority calculates itself with 8 
percent return rate, which is a very conservative assumption against the background 
of recent return rates. A “contribution of INR 10 a day from age 25 (INR 3,600 a 
year) until age 60 would provide a monthly inflation-indexed pension of INR 1,500 
on retirement at 61, an amount well above the poverty line monthly income” (Rajan 
2008: 32). In 2009-10, despite the financial crisis, NPS had return rates of “26 in 
                                                        
23 Bhardwaj criticizes that Swavalamban requires a minimum of INR 1,000 p.a. The GoI should 
incentivize saving in general by also matching lower contributions (Interview Bhardwaj 2011).  
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equities, 11% in corporate bonds and 5% in government bonds with a simple average 
of 12%” (Sanyal et al. 2011: 19). In contrast, the PPF has a fixed rate of return of 8 
percent (Dlima 2011). In 2009, pension funds in OECD countries had on average a 
rate of return of 6.5 percent in real terms (OECD 2011: 182).24 Thus, from a national 
as well as international perspective, the NPS return rate is highly competitive.  
Currently, the scheme’s tax benefits apply the Income-Tax Act, 1961, which 
means that the scheme falls under the EET (exempt-exempt-taxable) category: 
contributions and returns are exempt, withdrawals – but not annuities - attract tax 
(Dhall 2009). In contrast, PPF and EPFO schemes fall under EEE, i.e. contributions, 
returns, and withdrawals are tax-free (ibid). However, with the New Direct Tax Code 
(DTC), which will replace the existing Income Tax Act on 1 April 2012, NPS will 
also fall under the EEE category. In addition, if the employer would decide to 
contribute up to 10 percent of the salary to the account, this contribution will be tax-
free as well (Dlima 2011).  
The Retirement age for both NPS and NPS-Lite is age 60. In March 2011, the 
retirement age of persons receiving the Swavalamban subsidy, which was launched in 
2010 to subsidize economically disadvantaged groups, was decreased from age 60 to 
age 50 provided that there was a minimum tenure of 20 years (Financial Chronicle 
2011). The GoI does not mention any rationale for this act (Asher 2011), which is 
opposite to reform trends in other countries. Increasing longevity and a life 
expectancy at age 30 of approximately 73 years, even for the poorer segments, would 
result in a relatively long average retirement period of 23 years.  
 
c) Enrollment process 
All resident Indian citizens between 18 and 55 years can open an NPS/NPS Lite 
account. Interested citizens can visit one of the PoPs or aggregators.25 For NPS 
subscriptions, the Subscriber Registration Form “UOS-S1” is available online and at 
                                                        
24 The best performing pension funds among OECD countries in 2009 were Chile (23%), Hungary 
(17%), the Netherlands (16%), and Luxembourg (14%). On the other hand, in countries like the Czech 
Republic and Korea, pension funds had, on average, low positive investment rates of returns (under 
5%). Pension funds in Iceland even experienced a negative performance in 2009 (–10%). (OECD 2011: 
182)  
25 In 2011, India started the Unique Identification project, which is a registration of the entire 
population, where every Indian will be registered and will receive a passport, the UID Card. Once this 
process is complete, it will be a major facilitator for social security registration in general (Mariathasan 
2011: 25).   
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the PoPs, which has to be filled out and returned to the PoP (India Post 2011). For 
NPS-Lite, the same applies to the “Application for Allotment of Permanent 
Retirement Account Number (PRAN) under NPS Lite”, which needs to be returned to 
an aggregator (CRA 2011). According to the “Know Your Customer” (KYC) 
conditions, the subscriber has to provide a proof of identity and an address proof. 
There are many options for both, including passports or water bills (PFRDA 2009: 
267 f.). Subscribers are required to bring original documents, two photocopies, and 
attach a recent color-photograph. The reason is to make sure that there is only one 
account per person. For the basic NPS Tier-1 and for NPS-Lite accounts, subscribers 
do not require a bank account, but for Tier-2 subscriptions they do. The Forms are 
simple and only consist of two pages including name, date of birth, address, and 
choice of investment option. There are special forms for both NPS and NPS-Lite 
customers if they want to request the Swavalamban subsidy. All forms are only 
available in English, which will be a major burden for a large part of the target group, 
especially of NPS-Lite, who are not English speakers.  
Along with the enrollment documents, the subscriber has to make the first 
contribution with a minimum amount of INR 500 for a Tier I account, INR 1,000 for 
Tier-II, or INR 100 for an NPS-Lite account. The PoP/aggregator issues a receipt 
through which the subscriber can track the status of the application. Contributions can 
be made either by cash, as local check, or via demand draft electronic clearing service 
(PFRDA 2009: 250). Within a certain time schedule, PoPs/aggregators direct 
applications and contributions to the CRA, which forwards the capital to the PFM, 
who then invests it in the chosen fund. CRA issues the PRAN number and within 15 
days after the application it will dispatch the PRAN kit with two pin-numbers, which 
will be used to check statements of transactions online or to change details submitted 
to PoPs (PFRDA 2009: 269 f.). The PoP will hand out a Welcome-Kit to the 
subscriber, which is an information package about the NPS rules and functional 
mechanisms (PFRDA 2011e). CRA also provides a web-based interface26 where 
subscribers can view details and request to change details online, generate a portfolio 
query, and view the transaction history, raise grievances, and reset pin-numbers 
(PFRDA 2009: 236). 
                                                        
26 www.cra-nsdl.com  
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A. 13 provides an overview of charges and fees. The main factor is an annual 
maintenance charge of INR 280 [4.44 €] for NPS. The other charges are lower 
including a charge of INR 6 [1 Cent] per transaction. Charges for NPS-Lite accounts 
include an INR 70 [1.1 €] annual subscriber charge; the first 12 transactions are free 
and afterwards it is INR 5 per transaction (Appendix 13).  
In sum, all processes are very transparent, there are processes for grievances, 
charges especially for NPS-Lite are low, and the bureaucratic effort of the enrollment 
process appears to be efficient and does not seem to be a major subscription burden 
besides the English language barrier.  
 
d) Pull-Marketing  
According to Bhardwaj and Jain, the GoI has failed in approaching the people in 
a targeted way (Interviews Bhardwaj and Jain 2011). There is a wide difference 
between what PFRDA planned and what the agency has actually implemented. In the 
“NPS-Lite - Swavalamban Promotion Framework”, PFRDA planned two media 
campaigns (PFRDA 2010c: 1). In the “nationwide campaign”, PFRDA wanted to 
release advertisements on NPS-Lite in “all National level newspapers with large 
coverage” and the agency planned to commission a company to broadcast 
advertisements in TV and radio channels (PFRDA 2010c: 1). According to Nair, 
PFRDA is currently planning a TV spot advertisement with the Hindi slogan “pension 
nahi yeh pran hai” [This is not pension, this is life] (Interview Nair 2011). Besides 
this TV spot, PFRDA has not started implementing the other above-mentioned plans. 
Marketing has been reduced to a simple information campaign without any targeting 
in terms of income groups, occupations, or age. Main results of this are two flyers, 
which can be found in A.12. The first flyer advertises both NPS and NPS Lite and the 
second advertises only NPS and is distributed by the PFRDA to all PoPs to use for 
NPS advertisement.  
A problematic situation is that roles are not clearly defined between aggregators, 
PoPs, and PFRDA with regard to the promotion and marketing of the strategy. With 
regard to the aggregators, PFRDA appears to outsource marketing and promotion 
(PFRDA 2010b: 13). PFRDA funds their promotion activities on a case-by-case basis 
(PFRDA 2010c: 3). There is no such possibility for PoPs.  
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III.3 Mismatch of Supply and Demand: Reasons for Low Coverage   
NPS could potentially provide future pensions of at least poverty level to around 
40 million persons (market segments 1 and 2). With NPS-Lite and the Swavalamban 
subsidy, NPS could be afforded by another 40 million (market segment 3) with 
savings capacities to purchase annuities on a level of 80 to 100 percent of the national 
poverty level, and for a certain share of market segment 4 encompassing another 50 
million. In sum, the potential market for NPS and NPS-Lite is about 100 to 130 
million persons. There are many convincing features of NPS, which match the 
demand side: The scheme offers the best return rates and tax treatments, it is portable 
and flexible in terms of investments, and it offers a choice of service providers and 
fund managers. Structures and processes are relatively simple, transparent and 
enrollment processes are not bureaucratic. The following policy problems could be 
identified as the main causes for low NPS-coverage. This assessment integrates the 
theoretical analysis of criteria for the assessment of pension market forces and the 
analysis of both market forces that was conducted in the previous two sections:  
1. Applying a holistic market perspective and developing a scheme that satisfies 
workers’ financial preferences: NPS fulfills parts of this criterion with its 
competitive rate of return, tax treatments, and flexible contribution rules. But NPS 
does not offer several investment options that other Indian schemes do offer and 
which are demanded by vast shares of the market. The scheme has no real early 
withdrawal-possibilities and no guaranteed rate of return, which PPF has. This policy 
choice is reasonable to avoid subscribers using NPS only as a short-term saving 
option with high returns. However, it likely causes a certain share of the economically 
disadvantaged persons to refuse investing in NPS as they have irregular incomes and 
could need the investment prior to retirement. As shown in II.3, enrollment rates for 
other products, such as the PPF, are not better either. Nevertheless, if a person decides 
to invest in a long-term saving scheme and important criteria are not fulfilled by the 
scheme but by competing schemes, this will also cause continuing low enrollment. 
But a more severe shortcoming is that NPS does not satisfy the general preferences to 
secure investments as there are no guaranteed returns.   
2. Building confidence in long-term (political) stability and the feasibility of 
scheme and investment: The scheme is financially sustainable because it is a fully 
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funded scheme. Even with an aging society, India will not face any financial 
difficulties with this scheme. Nevertheless, PFRDA leaves both the general and the 
expert public with the impression of an unstable political and legal situation for four 
reasons. First, the GoI implemented PFRDA and NPS without Parliament having 
passed the PFRDA Bill resulting in pending regulations and a nebulous legal status of 
NPS rules. Second, PFRDA’s double mission of regulation and supervision leads to 
conflicting interests. Third, from the consumer’s perspective, it will be even more 
worrisome that PFRDA has not decided about the ASP and the concrete process of 
annuity provision. This will reduce the trust of potential customers in the scheme as 
long as they do not know by whom and how exactly their annuities will be paid. 
Fourth, it is vital to notice that the Indian workforce is highly risk averse concerning 
financial investments. People favor security over high returns and public financial 
institutions over private banks. NPS has a huge private sector involvement due to 
PoPs and PFMs. This situation combined with the fact that the NPS is a product 
without any guarantees on the rate of return has probably frightened off large shares 
of the market, especially poorer market segments 3 and 4.  
3. Developing effective distribution channels and utilizing the private sector: In 
its push-marketing approach, PFRDA has tried to utilize expertise, customer relations, 
and private sector infrastructures of local organizations, such as financial sector 
institutions, NGOs, self-help groups, trade unions, and welfare boards. While this 
distribution-approach is generally a very reasonable concept, its implementation has 
almost completely failed for three reasons. First and most importantly, PFRDA has 
not provided enough incentives for PoPs to turn NPS enrollments into one of their 
priorities. The NPS based revenues of POPs have to compete with revenues from 
other financial products. The flat rate of INR 150 per subscriber is too low to provide 
enough incentives. As a result, PoPs are incentivized to channel potential NPS 
subscriber to other financial products. Second, as already described with regard to 
criterion 2, this distribution channel has even more problems to function effectively 
because of the lacking confidence in private financial organizations. And third, the 
question of access of potential subscribers to PoPs and aggregators is unclear. PFRDA 
has not developed any map and does not have any data on regional distribution. 
4. Implementing targeted and tailored (pull-) marketing approaches: PFRDA has 
a generic pull-marketing strategy, which is not implemented, and completely lacks a 
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targeted pull-marketing strategy that would address different occupational groups. 
Pull-marketing is the only way to reach those persons who are not customers of PoPs 
or aggregators and to raise demand for a product under the following three 
circumstances. First, neither the product nor the concept of pensions is known to the 
majority of workers. Second, the majority will not see a reason to invest in NPS as 
they do not believe that they will survive into their seventies, and two thirds of all 
workers have never thought about retirement (Butel 2010: 69). Third, the majority 
distrusts private financial institutions and they favor short-term and secure savings. In 
addition, enrollment forms are only available in English, although four fifths of the 
population does not understand English, so they will be likely left out. 
 Thus, NPS has vast shortcomings concerning all four criteria resulting in an all-
encompassing structural problem. The failure of PFRDA to fulfill criterion 3 
(effective distribution channels) is more responsible for the low coverage of wealthier 
market segments 1 and 2. In contrast, failures in terms of criteria 1 (satisfaction of 
financial preferences) and 2 (public confidence) have more impacts on the low 
coverage of poorer market segments 3 and 4. Failure to fulfill criterion 4 appears to 
adversely affect coverage of all market segments. As a result, developing the right 
policies to solve these different failures will have corresponding effects on the 
enrollment rates in different market segments, which needs to be considered in the 
solution analysis that follows. It would be a political choice to rank the reasons for 
low coverage because simultaneously the relevance to provide access to wealthier vs. 
poorer segments would be ranked. However, in terms of pure numbers irrespective of 
the market segments, it is obvious that if distribution channels are not interested in 
distributing the product, and if the product and its advantages are not known to the 
public, NPS enrollment rates will likely stay low in the long run. In contrast, the other 
shortcomings, such as that the PFRDA Bill has yet to pass or that the scheme does not 
operate in regional languages, are less relevant in terms of immediate enrollment 
quantity. There are still millions of potential NPS subscribers who speak English and 
understand enrollment forms. Large shares of people who already subscribed to NPS 
probably do not know that the bill has not been passed; hence, it would not hinder the 
masses to subscribe. Nevertheless, these shortcomings are part of a NPS concept that 
is unconvincing right now and they need to be tackled in a comprehensive way. 
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IV. Matching Demand and Supply: Recommendations to    
Increase NPS Coverage  
The problem analysis concluded that the reasons for low NPS coverage are located 
on different levels of the NPS architecture. As a result, there cannot be a single solution 
to increase NPS coverage. Rather it requires a whole policy package with short- and 
long-term measures that address the current, multifaceted shortcomings. The following 
sections explain recommendations that address the fulfillment of all four criteria. While 
some recommendations are straightforward and do not require extensive elaboration, 
others are more complicated and offer options for further action: 
In order to fulfill criterion 1: 
1. PFRDA should improve the security of NPS investments for two reasons: First, 
the opposing left parties have asked for these changes of the NPS regulation in order to 
accept the pending PFRDA Bill. Thus, the GoI might need this concession to achieve 
the political consensus to pass the bill (Point 2). Second, this measure would allow the 
GoI to defy public skepticism, in particular of the poorer market segments 3 and 4, 
about the security of saving. How legislation should be changed requires further 
research. There are two options: either the GoI guarantees a minimum pension or it 
ensures a minimum rate of return. Prima facie, a minimum pension might attract even 
more subscribers, but it could also be a high risk for the long-term financial 
sustainability of the scheme. The guarantee for a rate of return of 8 percent seems like 
the best option. This rate is realistic because even at the lowest points of the recent 
financial crisis, NPS had a return rate of 12 percent, and it is necessary to be able to 
compete with PPF, which currently offers the same guarantee. 
In order to fulfill criterion 2: 
2. The GoI should convince Parliament to adopt the PFRDA Bill as soon as 
possible. A fixed regulation would equip PFRDA with the formal authority to 
supervise the NPS architecture and to start regulating the whole pension sector, 
including the other schemes. Only after the legislation is passed, PFRDA should 
continue with further implementations because the legal status of the NPS regulation is 
nebulous and provides a disastrous impression of the long-term reliability of NPS. This 
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step will be vital to fulfill criterion 1. 
3. PFRDA should nominate the ASPs after the PFRDA Bill is passed in order to raise 
the transparency of the scheme’s architecture and to increase the trust of potential 
subscribers in the functioning of the scheme.  
In order to fulfill criterion 3: 
4. PFRDA should increase the effectiveness of its distribution channels, 
particularly the PoP performance. There are two policy options according to the various 
experts interviewed in January 2011.  
a)  Coordination of NPS-Lite and RSBY enrollment processes: This option follows 
the rationale of utilizing possible synergies from coordinating NPS and RSBY 
enrollment processes. RSBY is a government funded health insurance for BPL-
households. With 23,362,463 active RSBY smart cards on 31 March 31 2011 (RSBY 
2011), the RSBY enrollment process has been much more successful than the NPS 
process. The main reason for the better performance of RSBY is that RSBY attracts 
subscribers easily because they only have to invest INR 30 per enrollment with an 
immediate effect (Interview Jain 2011). They receive health insurance but do not have 
to invest their own money. Interviewed experts thought that two features of RSBY 
could be utilized to foster NPS enrollments if both enrollment processes were 
coordinated. First, the attractiveness of RSBY could be used to also attract persons to 
join NPS (Interviews Bhardwaj, Chopra, Jain, Palacios 2011). Second, the data – name, 
address, age, proof of identity – would only need to be collected once. According to 
Palacios, the smart card, which is used for RSBY, could then be extended to a social 
security smart card, which would also save the NPS data (Interviews Bhardwaj, 
Chopra, Jain, Palacios, Nair 2011) 
Conversely, the coordination of both processes could not work without 
considerable restructurings for four reasons. First, RSBY enrollments are conducted by 
insurance companies selected by the state governments. Second, RSBY has a different 
policy cycle. Insurers only enroll beneficiaries four months a year and insurers are paid 
on this monthly basis. Third, the enrollment process itself differs from the NPS 
approach. RSBY enrollments take only around 10 minutes for one individual and 
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his/her household because there is no need for consultancy (Interview Chopra 2011). 
The fourth issue is that eligibility depends on BPL-status. (RSBY 2011) 
To coordinate both enrollment processes, either the insurance companies of the 
RSBY architecture would need to engage in NPS enrollments as well, or PoPs and 
aggregators would need to conduct RSBY enrollments, too. Only the second option 
makes sense because NPS has the more complex and knowledge-intensive enrollment 
process, which could not simply be conducted by the RSBY insurance companies. The 
remuneration of insurance companies and their selection would need to be adjusted to 
the new situation. Combined enrollments would be much more time-consuming and 
require more consulting efforts. The whole policy design of the schemes would need to 
be adjusted because both schemes have different target groups. This would be possible 
but much more expensive for the GoI. There are two options: either subsidizing NPS 
for BPL-persons or extending RSBY eligibility to wealthier households such as NPS 
market segments 3 and 4, which belong to the poorer segments but who are not as poor 
as BPL-persons. Then, a new procedure would need to be found to test such an 
eligibility status and to facilitate RSBY enrollments during the whole year. 
Hence, this paper advances the recommendation to further follow the idea of 
combined enrollments if there would be the political will to adjust target groups of both 
programs. In this case that it becomes the interest of the GoI, the RSBY enrollment 
process and policy cycle should be adjusted to the NPS system. Though this scenario 
might rather be an option in the medium- to long run, there is already a need to foster 
coordination and collaboration of the responsible ministries MoLE, MoHF, and MoF 
for the implementation of a comprehensive social security system and to avoid 
inefficient parallel structures in the future. 
b) Increasing the Incentives for PoPs 
 Compared to the previous option, it seems more advisable to improve existing 
structures. Fortunately, the aggregators have started performing fairly well in recent 
months so that the primary concern of PFRDA should be to increase incentives for 
PoPs. Rather than simply raising incentives per subscriber, PFRDA should implement 
an incentive scheme, which fulfills two criteria. On the one hand, it should incentivize 
enrollments on a larger scale and on the other hand, it should introduce competition 
between PoPs as a means to raise their performance. Thus, PFRDA should introduce 
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competitive policies and performance management of PoPs. For instance, PFRDA 
could post rewards based on a benchmarking system. PoPs already provide monthly 
statements to PFRDA that could be used to reward PoPs. Rewards should be based on 
quantitative targets for numbers of enrolled subscribers, which has also been an 
effective tool for aggregators. The target should be slightly higher than the achievement 
of a current best practice PoP as an indicator of what PoPs can potentially achieve. A 
quarterly or half-year cycle should be envisaged for benchmarking periods. Rewards 
should be supported by publishing PoP achievements as advertisement. For instance, an 
article on the best performing PoP could be published together with an interview of the 
branch manager, where he/she should explain the recipe for the success on the PFRDA 
website. Thus, both manager and the whole institution would additionally be 
incentivized through public recognition, which they currently lack. Nevertheless, the 
reward would need to be a considerable lump-sum bonus. Clearly, this would raise 
costs for the GoI but considering that the scheme is otherwise fully funded, this appears 
to be a reasonable additional investment. In order to test such a performance 
management model, pilot projects should be conducted in Gujarat, Rajasthan, or 
Karnataka with highest density of persons belonging to market segments 1 and 2.  
5. PFRDA should map regional coverage of both aggregators and PoPs. Based on 
results, PFRDA should approach organizations to become aggregators/PoPs in regions 
with low coverage of service providers. 
In order to fulfill criterion 4: 
6.   PFRDA should implement a pull-marketing strategy: There are clear-cut market 
segments, which differ with regard to savings capacities, familiarity with financial 
products, education, and saving priorities. Thus, there is no one-size-fits-all marketing 
solution but there are different options to decide on target groups for marketing 
concepts. Finding an appropriate marketing strategy clearly involves extensive research 
on media behavior and methods of advertising in India. At first glance, two options 
appear most relevant. First, PFRDA could design different strategies to reach different 
income groups. Market segments 1 and 2 will likely be attracted by the competitive rate 
of return and tax exemptions. They are likely accessible via advertisements in the 
biggest daily newspapers and through television commercials. Market segments 3 and 4 
have much higher shares of illiteracy, are poorer, demand more financial security and 
probably have access to radio information but not to TV and newspapers. General 
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advertisements could be published on rickshaws and busses that are widely used 
everywhere in India. A basic marketing message should transport the following key 
facts. Today, even poor Indians on average reach 73 years of age. Everybody who 
wants to retire one day should have a pension to fall back on in old age, as to not 
depend on the income of their children. If you save only INR 100 with the New 
Pension Scheme of the Government of India per month for 30 years, you will yield a 
vast pension corpus at age 60 of INR 182,641 (IIMS 2008: 21). The scheme is flexible 
concerning investments, portable all over India, and has higher return rates compared to 
similar schemes; more information is available at institutions xyz, which are regulated 
and supervised by a government authority.  
 Second, PFRDA could target different occupational groups. In particular, farmers 
comprise a large share of the market segments but they are the most difficult to reach 
because they mostly live in rural areas and they score the lowest on formal education 
and literacy. Thus, they will probably be left out by most forms of media 
advertisement.  
7. In addition to English, PFRDA should offer enrollment forms in Hindi and in 
the most relevant regional languages. The same should apply to advertisements 
and media campaigns.  
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V. Conclusion 
The process of pension reform initiated in the early 1990s resulted in the 
implementation of the NPS to expand the low pension coverage in India, particularly 
for the country’s vast and growing informal sector. The new pension authority PFRDA 
operationalized the voluntary DC scheme in May 2009. Now, almost two years after 
the implementation, NPS has attracted only 167,002 voluntary subscribers.  
It was assumed that the coverage of NPS could only be increased if supply and 
demand match. This paper identified four criteria to assess the (mis-)match of demand 
and supply and to explain where policy options should be better targeted to address the 
low enrollment rate: (1) applying a holistic market perspective and developing a 
scheme that satisfies workers’ financial preferences, (2) building confidence in long-
term (political) stability and the feasibility of scheme and investment, (3) developing 
effective distribution channels and utilizing the private sector, and (4) implementing 
targeted and tailored (pull-) marketing approaches.  
As argued in the problem analysis in Chapter III, there is no simple answer to the 
reasons for low coverage. The status quo of the policy shows a comprehensive picture 
of policy shortcomings with regard to all four criteria that could be translated into four 
reasons for low coverage. First, the fact that there is no guarantee on returns and no real 
early withdrawal possibility has likely frightened off potential subscribers. Second, 
PFRDA has challenged the trust of the population in the long-term political stability of 
NPS due to the unclear legal status of the legislation and the process of annuity 
provision. Third, two factors block the distribution of the scheme: on the one hand, the 
workforce has low trust in private financial institutions. On the other hand, private 
sector institutions are the major distribution channels, so far 8,894 PoPs, who have not 
been incentivized enough to turn NPS into one of their sales priorities. Each PoP 
managed a highly discouraging average of seven enrollments since the implementation 
of the scheme in May 2009. Finally, PFRDA has not developed a targeted pull-
marketing strategy, which is necessary to explain the rationale of a pension scheme to 
the population, who does not know that they will survive into their seventies. However, 
targeting has also failed in a simple aspect, which is the operating language. English is 
not spoken by four fifths of the population but is used in the enrollment process, at least 
for the enrollment forms.  
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PFRDA realized the low performance of NPS in the course of 2010. Instead of 
improving the existing scheme, the institution developed new features, NPS-Lite, and 
the Swavalamban subsidy. These reforms meant a practical increase of the NPS target 
group. Though never officially mentioned but practiced through the PoP-approach, 
initially NPS targeted the comparatively small Indian middle class, customers of banks, 
and insurance companies. By introducing NPS-Lite, the target group was extended to 
the vast group of economically disadvantaged people. NPS-Lite proved much more 
successful than NPS, although some features of NPS – almost no early withdrawal 
possibilities, no guaranteed returns – are not in line with the financial preferences of 
lower income segments. These efforts have yielded better results because of the higher 
incentives of aggregators, who are rewarded based on mass enrollments, but also 
because aggregators do not only follow cost-benefit considerations.  
Thus, a priority for the future is certainly to foster and extend the promising 
aggregator network. Furthermore, it is the role of PFRDA to solve the other NPS 
shortcomings, which are still major barriers to the potential great success of NPS. 
According to the problem analysis and the four criteria, this paper presented a set of 
seven proposals that should improve NPS and achieve much higher enrollment rates. 
The most immediate and largest effects in terms of increasing coverage should result 
from two recommendations. First, PFRDA should improve the push-marketing of its 
major distribution channel, the PoP network, by introducing performance management 
and increasing incentives for PoP. The second policy problem concerns the lacking 
pull-marketing strategy of PFRDA. The institution needs to develop a general 
awareness campaign and establish targeted marketing tools. Detailed recommendations 
were described in Chapter IV. If distribution channels are not interested in distributing 
the product, and if the product and its advantages are not known to the public, NPS 
enrollment rates will likely stay low in the long run. In contrast, the other shortcomings 
are less relevant in terms of immediate enrollment quantity. Nevertheless, these 
shortcomings are part of a NPS concept that is unconvincing right now and they need to 
be tackled in a comprehensive way that includes the following five proposals. As soon 
as possible, the GoI should convince Parliament to adopt the PFRDA Bill to bring 
about clarity in the complicated legal situation. PFRDA should consider improving the 
security of NPS investments for two reasons. First, the opposing parties on the left have 
asked for these changes so that they might be necessary concessions to pass the bill. 
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Second, with this measure the GoI would disprove public skepticism, in particular of 
the poorer market segments 3 and 4 who likely fear that their savings are not secure. 
Along these lines of improving confidence in the scheme, PFRDA should nominate the 
ASPs to clarify the process of annuity provision, which will be one of the most 
interesting parts of the scheme for every investor. In order to make sure that the 
network of PoPs and aggregators covers the whole country, PFRDA should map 
regional coverage of distributors and strategically fill regional coverage gaps in order to 
improve NPS access all over India. Finally, PFRDA should offer enrollment forms not 
only in English but also in Hindi and in the most relevant regional languages. The same 
should apply to advertisements and media campaigns. 
If the GoI and PFRDA intend to develop the scheme in the described direction, the 
scheme has the potential of covering 100 to 130 million persons in the long run. The 
challenges are too complex to expect coverage to go up to these levels in the short run. 
Through the PoP network, however, it should be possible to enroll 20 million persons, 
who are able to afford NPS and who expressed keen interest in the scheme, and through 
the effective aggregator network, another 20 million subscribers will become a realistic 
scenario in the medium run if the described policies are conducted.  
Finally, it is important to apply a broader policy perspective because pensions are a 
means to a broader end than providing income in old age. In a comprehensive social 
security system, they should contribute to raising socioeconomic growth and cohesion. 
The introduction of social security for workers in informal jobs is of high and even 
increasing relevance because almost the entire job growth in India is informal as 
described in Chapter II. This is an alarming signal as informalization goes hand in hand 
with the circumvention of minimum social standards and labor legislation. India has a 
massive problem with the fact that the economy is not producing enough jobs and 
certainly no regular employment. The challenges arising from this situation require 
comprehensive reforms of economic policies, education, and social security, which will 
have highly comprehensive effects. Aspects such as high rates of (financial) illiteracy 
and low savings capacities are of course the most important reasons for low pension 
coverage in general and low enrollment rates of the NPS. However, these aspects could 
not be included in this study since it is not the role of a pension scheme to solve these 
problems. Regardless, improvements in these broader socioeconomic development 
fields will have the largest effects on voluntary pension enrollments in the long run. 
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1) List of Interview Partners  
 
Transcriptions of all interviews can be requested from the author.  
 
 
 Gautam Bhardwaj is Director of the Invest India Economic Foundation 
(IIEF), which he founded in 1990. The IIEF is the major Indian think tank 
and policy consultancy that focuses on pensions and old age security. The 
Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment commissioned the OASIS (Old 
Age Social & Income Security) Project, which prepared the NPS reform, to 
the IIEF. Gautam Bhardwaj was a member of the OASIS project group and 
co-authored the OASIS Report. He was involved in further research projects, 
including several projects by the ADB, and has been actively involved in the 
NPS reforms as a policy consultant to the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The interview was conducted on 11 January 2011 at the India Habitat Centre, 
New Delhi, and focused on the institutional architecture, history of the 
pension reforms, market segments, and current challenges. The author is also 
thankful for the invitation to the IIEF’s Thursday Seminar on 20 January 
2011, and insights from Ashish Aggarwal (co-promoter of Invest India 
Micro Pension Services (IIMPS)), and Wyly Wade (consultant at the World 
Bank India).   
 
 Nitin Chaudhary is Senior Manager at IFMR Rural Finance (The Institute 
for Financial Management and Research) in Chennai, India. IFMR is one 
among currently 20 aggregators distributing NPS-Lite. IFMR Rural Finance 
offers financial products to low income groups in rural areas.  
 
The written interview was conducted on 16 February 2011 and focused on the 
experiences of IFMR as an aggregator, enrollment process, and data on 
subscribers. 
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 Sumita Chopra is a consultant with the World Bank in New Delhi. She is an 
expert on the RSBY health Insurance scheme of the GoI, Unique 
Identification and other programs, in particular providing Smart Card-based 
solutions and enrollment processes.  
 
The interview was conducted on 28 January 2011 at the World Bank office in 
New Delhi and focused on enrollment processes and the potentials of social 
security smart cards. 
 
 Nishant Jain is Senior Technical Specialist on Social Protection at the GIZ 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) in India. He was 
a technical advisor for the RSBY health insurance project and has been 
involved in consulting the Ministry of Labour and Employment on NPS 
implementation. 
 
Interviews were conducted on January 10 and 24, 2011 in the GIZ office in 
New Delhi. The interviews focused on the potentials of NPS and NPS-Lite, 
enrollment processes, and synergies with RSBY. 
 
 T. Koshy was Executive Director at the CRA until January 2011 (Central 
Recordkeeping Agency) in Mumbai, India.  
 
The telephone interview was conducted on 24 January 2011 and focused on 
enrollment processes, the potentials of NPS-Lite mass enrollments, and 
challenges to improving NPS.   
 
 Rani S. Nair is Executive Director of the PFRDA (Pension Fund Regulatory 
and Development Authority). She developed NPS-Lite.  
 
The interview was conducted on 27 January 2011 at the PFRDA in New 
Delhi. The interview focused on the rationale and potentials of NPS and 
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NPS-Lite, the authority’s perspective on major challenges and possible 
solutions.  
 
 Robert Palacios is Senior Pension Economist at the World Bank. As a 
member of the team that produced "Averting the Old Age Crisis" in 1994, 
Mr. Palacios has written extensively on topics of pension reform. He has also 
been involved in pension reform operations in various countries around the 
world. Mr. Palacios has worked for several years at the World Bank’s India 
office and manages an applied research project known as the Pension Reform 
Primer.  
 
As supervisor of the Master’s Thesis, he was not directly interviewed, but 
several insights from conversations with him shaped the development of this 
paper. 
 
 Srinivas Ragunathan is General Manager at CAMS (Computer Age 
Management Services) in Chennai, India. CAMS branches work as both PoP 
and aggregator. CAMS offers Transaction Processing and Customer Care in 
the Mutual Fund Industry.  
 
The telephone interview was conducted on 10 February 2011 and focused on 
CAMS’ experiences as both POP and aggregator.  
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2) Characteristics of Potential Customers in Market Segments 1 & 2 
 
(Butel 2010: 112) 
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(Butel 2010: 113) 
Explanation with regard to the market segments: Both segments refer to the 19.5 million workers, who 
belong to the primary market segment and who already expressed keen interest in the scheme: 
 
- Market segment 1: Those who at the present time are either actively planning to, or expecting to, 
retire (3.2 million workers).  
 
- Market segment 2: Those who at the present time have not given thought to their retirement income 
needs (16.3 million workers). (Butel 2010: 111) 
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3) Summary View of Market Segment 1 
 
(Butel 2010: 135; modified by the author) 
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4) Small Retailing Businesses in Market Segment 1: 
 
 
(Butel 2010: 118) 
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5) State Distribution of Key Occupations in Market Segments 1 & 2  
 
 
(Butel 2010: 136; 2001 Census, NPS National Data Survey) 
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6) Subscribers Registered under NPS as of 7 February 2011 
 
(PFRDA 2011) 
 
7) Development of Real Wages per day of Regular Workers  
 
(Ghosh 2011: 144) 
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8) Real Wages of Casual Workers  
 
(Ghosh 2011: 146) 
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9) Risk Perceptions of Latent Demand  
 
(IIMS 2008: 12) 
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10) List of PFMs and PoPs as of December 2010 
 
(Source: PFRDA 2011 e: 7)) 
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11) List of Appointed Aggregators as of March 2011 
 
(PFRDA 2011 a) 
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12) PFRDA Flyer to Promote NPS 
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(PFRDA 2011 d) 
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13) Fees and Charges for NPS and NPS-Lite Accounts  
a) NPS accounts: 
 
(PFRDA 2011 e: 4) 
 
 
Appendix  76 
 
 
 
b) NPS-Lite accounts: 
 
(PFRDA 2010: 14) 
 
